

OFFICE OF FOOD FOR PEACE – STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE I  
***“CRITICAL FOOD NEEDS OF TARGETED GROUPS MET”***

RESULTS REVIEW  
RESOURCE REQUEST FY 2002

OFFICE OF FOOD FOR PEACE – EMERGENCY RESPONSE DIVISION  
BUREAU FOR HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE  
UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

**MAY 22, 2000**

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Memorandum to: Assistant Administrator Hugh Parmer, AA/BHR

From: William T. Oliver, Director, BHR/FFP  
David N. Hagen, SO1 Team Leader, BHR/FFP/ER

Subject: Strategic Objective 1: FY 1999 Results Review

The Office of Food for Peace is pleased to present the Emergency Response Division's Results Review for FY 1999. This report marks the completion of four years of implementing the Office of Food for Peace's Strategic Plan, 1997 – 2001. The Resource Request for FY 2002 is submitted as a separate document.

The Office of Food Peace, Emergency Response Division, continues to suffer from lack of staff resources to manage the many emergency activities for which we are held accountable. Despite the staff limitations, we have been able to meet the majority of our objectives through the extraordinary efforts of our dedicated staff.

## **PART I: OVERVIEW AND FACTORS AFFECTING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE**

In Fiscal Year (FY) 1999, the Office of Food for Peace provided 792,116 metric tons of Title II emergency food aid, valued at over \$513 million to 30 countries. This provided for the critical food needs of at least 14 million (14,052,166) people originally planned for, or **82.29 percent of the beneficiaries targeted by our partners**. Half of the programs reported reaching more beneficiaries than originally targeted, assisting an additional 2,611,037 people. Thus, the Office of Food for Peace (SO1 team) met the critical food needs of a minimum of 16 million (16,663,203) beneficiaries. These numbers represent beneficiary levels that are supported by reports.

In addition, the SO1 team provided bilateral assistance to Ethiopia and Rwanda, and to the World Food Programme's Protracted Relief Operations (PROs) and Protracted Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (PRROs) that targeted over 10 million beneficiaries, for an overall level of assistance to 26 million vulnerable people. See Annex 1 for further information on FY 1999 beneficiaries reached versus beneficiaries targeted by region, country and implementing partner.

FY 1999 witnessed an unprecedented combination of events that dramatically increased the need for emergency food aid. Hurricanes Mitch and Georges struck Central America and the Caribbean in September and October 1998. This caused extensive damage and loss of life throughout the region. The damages in the agricultural sector and destruction of houses are estimated to be over five billion dollars. The crisis in Kosovo forced an estimated 700,000 people to cross the borders into Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro in spring 1999. This complex operation required considerable resources, including extensive coordination with other USAID offices and the World Food Programme (WFP).

In the face of these "mega disasters", a major factor that continues to influence program performance is human and non-human financial constraints. The overall prospects through the budget request year are uncertain. Given predictions of "mega disasters" in the future, additional appropriate personnel, adequate operating expense and Development Assistance resources are required to meet increasing challenges.

The Office of Food for Peace, Emergency Response Division, has worked diligently to implement its Strategic Plan and institutionalize performance indicators within its reporting system. We have incrementally improved the measurement and the reporting of results, and continue to engage implementing partners in the process. The SO1 core team is comprised of staff members from the Emergency Response Division and Program Operations Division of the Office of Food for Peace.

## PART II: RESULTS REVIEW OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1

**Header:** SO Number: 962-001-01, Office of Food for Peace, Emergency Response Division – Strategic Objective 1 (SO1)

### Operating Unit Self-Assessment:

SO1 is *on track*. The team *exceeded the majority of its indicator targets for FY 1999* (see Table 1), and in particular, targets in the two critical results at the SO level. These are the percent of targeted population reached by food aid and the percent of programs reporting change (or maintenance) of nutritional status of target groups (Strategic Objective 1, indicators 1 and 2). SO1 also reached its performance targets in instituting a continuous process of needs assessment to target the most vulnerable groups (Intermediate Result 1, indicator 1), in linking relief to development (Intermediate Result 3, indicator 1), and ensuring that emergency food aid programs avoid the negative impacts of assistance by adopting core values of “do no harm” established by implementing partners (Intermediate Result 3, indicator 2).

Similar to last year, SO1 failed to meet targets in addressing special nutritional needs of different targeted groups (Intermediate Result 1, indicator 2), reducing pipeline shortages (Intermediate Result 2, indicator 1), and in strengthening of local groups (Intermediate Result 4, indicator 2). The latter is explained by the fact that the indicator was upgraded from percent of programs collaborating with local institutions for activity results. Since all programs collaborate with local institutions for activity results, the SO1 team sought to ensure that this led to strengthening of these groups. See Table 1 for overview of results.

### Summary (also for Congressional Presentation):

Strategic Objective 1 (SO1) of the Office of Food for Peace is “**Critical food needs of targeted groups met**”. SO1 seeks to ensure that Title II emergency food aid is provided to targeted populations in need. SO1 seeks to implement this using the “5 rights” approach: provide the right *food* to the right *people* in the right *place* (Intermediate Result 1), at the right *time* (Intermediate Result 2) and in the right *way* (Intermediate Results 3 and 4).

SO1 is directly linked to the Agency Humanitarian Assistance (HA) Goal 6 and Performance Goals “Crude mortality rate of vulnerable populations, in specific emergency situations, improved over a period of time” and “Levels of acute malnutrition stable at, or declining to, acceptable levels in specific emergency situations.” SO1 seeks to maintain or improve the nutritional status of children under five years of age in emergency situations. Implementing partners undertaking Title II emergency food aid programs provide data on nutritional status of beneficiaries, and whether or not programs are successful in maintaining or improving nutritional status. Starting from a base (FY 1996) of 37 percent of programs reporting change (or maintenance) of nutritional status

of target groups, this has incrementally improved to 65.91 percent (FY 1999). Over the life of the Strategic Plan (through FY 2001), the target is for 65 percent of programs to be able to maintain or improve nutritional status of beneficiaries as part of management-for-results efforts.

To achieve this, Title II emergency food aid should be provided on a timely basis (Intermediate Result 2) to populations identified as the most vulnerable (Intermediate Result 1). Vulnerable groups are those affected by natural or man-made disasters, or prolonged civil strife, and require critical food aid to survive or need assistance during a transition period to resettlement and rehabilitation. Disaster categories of beneficiaries include internally displaced persons, refugees, newly resettled or new returnees, and resident populations. Beneficiaries include children under five years old, pregnant and lactating women, malnourished children and adults, and the elderly. The SO1 team has consistently reached its targeted beneficiaries, and exceeded its set target for each fiscal year since FY 1996. During the reporting period for FY 1999, it reached 82.29 percent of targeted populations determined to be in critical need. Over the life of the Strategic Plan, through FY 2001, the target is to reach 85 percent of targeted beneficiaries.

Although crude mortality rate is not included in SO1's results framework and reporting requirements, the SO1 team supported the pilot testing of a methodology by an implementing partner (World Vision, Sudan) to integrate the collection of data on mortality with ongoing nutrition surveys. Experience from this will be shared with other implementing partners who have expressed interest in learning the methodology and to apply it in other emergency situations. The SO1 team will continue to improve reporting on nutritional status of children under five, and will seek to incrementally integrate the analysis of crude mortality rates for better interpretation of nutrition data.

### **Key Results:**

For FY 1999, the SO1 team is reporting on the results of four performance indicators. These are SO1 indicators 1 and 2, IR1 indicator 1, and IR3 indicator 1. Results would not have been achieved without the efforts of implementing partners, primarily U.S. PVOs and the World Food Programme (WFP).

#### *SO1 indicator 1: Percent of targeted population reached by food aid*

The SO1 team reached at least 82.29 percent of the population targeted by its implementing partners. This represents 14,052,166 beneficiaries of the total targeted 17,075,370 beneficiaries. Half of the programs reported reaching more beneficiaries than originally planned for. If these figures are included, the total number of people who received Title II emergency food aid totaled 16,663,203. SO1 exceeded its FY 1999 target of 75 percent in this performance indicator. See Annex 1 for compiled information on beneficiaries reached versus targeted by region, country, and implementing partner.

*SO1 indicator 2: Percent of programs reporting change (or maintenance) of nutritional status of target groups*

65.91 percent of programs reported to have improved and/or maintained nutritional status of beneficiaries. This is an improvement from last year's performance at 52.78 percent. Of those programs reporting to have contributed to maintaining or improving nutritional status of beneficiaries, 79.31 percent of programs indicated that they are able to provide supporting reports or data. This is a slight improvement from last year's 78.95 percent of programs able to provide such data.

SO1 exceeded its FY 1999 target of 55 percent in this performance indicator. Independent of meeting its performance target, tangible results on improvement in nutritional status of beneficiaries are reported. For example, the WFP program in Sudan reported the reduction of malnutrition rates from 20 - 32 percent to 10 - 20 percent due to food aid in project areas.<sup>1</sup> This is consistent with results of nutrition surveys conducted by World Vision, who continues to monitor the nutritional status of children under five in its two project areas in Bahr el Ghazal, South Sudan. Last year's R4 compared results of a nutrition survey undertaken in April /May 1998 with that of a follow-up survey in November 1998. Since then, World Vision conducted a survey in May 1999. The results showed that malnutrition levels were further reduced to 13.2% in Tonj county, and to 9.7% in Gogrial county. **This is the first time in twelve months that malnutrition levels fell below the 10%**, the cut off for critical levels of malnutrition in Sudan established by Operation Lifeline Sudan guidelines. The May 1999 survey was followed by a survey in November 1999 that demonstrated a further drop in malnutrition levels to 8% in Tonj county, and 5.9% in Gogrial county.

Overall, this is a significant improvement in nutritional status since April 1998, the beginning of the famine. In Tonj country, the program reduced malnutrition rate from 33.4% to 8%. In Gogrial country, malnutrition rates decreased from 40.8% to 5.9%.<sup>2</sup> The nutrition improvement is attributed to a number of factors including supplementary feeding for malnourished children and availability of adequate relief food. Relief food was accompanied with non-food agricultural inputs, and due to the relative security, communities were able to grow and harvest some food, supplementing the relief food. See Annex 11, Case Study 1, for further illustrations of achievements in nutritional status of beneficiaries as reported by Title II emergency food aid programs in FY 1999.

SO1's self-assessment that results are being achieved is supported by independent reports of other agencies. The Refugee Nutrition Information System (RNIS) of the U.N. Sub-Committee on Nutrition provides regular updates on the nutrition situation of refugees and displaced populations. In its report on the Kosovo crisis<sup>3</sup>, it indicated that wasting does not appear to be issue, and that the nutritional situation of refugees in camps in Albania and Macedonia was reported to be satisfactory and stable. The report indicated

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<sup>1</sup> WFP Sudan, R4 questionnaire for FY 1999

<sup>2</sup> World Vision, Sudan, Nutritional Survey reports for Tonj and Gogrial Counties, Bahr El Ghazal, South Sudan, November 1999

<sup>3</sup> RNIS 27, July 7, 1999

that **“overall, the international community was successful in preventing acute malnutrition, among the Kosovan refugees.”** See Annex II, Case Study 5, for information on the Response to the Kosovo Crisis (and lessons learned) by Title II emergency food aid programs.

In its report on assistance provided to people affected by Hurricane Mitch in Guatemala, CARE indicated “it is also important to note that no deaths were reported during the emergency period due to lack of food”.<sup>4</sup> See Annex II, Case Study 4, for information on the Response to the Hurricanes in Latin America and the Caribbean (and lessons learned) by Title II emergency food aid programs.

*IR1 indicator 1: Percent of programs that have instituted a continuous process of needs assessment and recalibration of targeting*

89.74 percent of programs reported to have instituted periodic needs assessments, exceeding the target of 60 percent. This is a slight improvement from last year’s result at 87.50 percent. This Intermediate Result seeks to ensure that food aid is effectively used and provided to the most vulnerable groups through a process of continuous needs assessments and monitoring of vulnerable groups.

*IR3 indicator 1: Percent of programs that have developed resettlement or rehabilitation plans to link relief to development*

77.36 percent of programs reported to have incorporated resettlement or rehabilitation strategies in their program plan and implementation. This exceeds the FY 1999 target of 75 percent, and is an improvement from last year’s result at 69.44 percent. See Annex II, Case Study 3, for illustration of a successful transition from relief to development in the context of Liberia.

### **Gender Issue:**

SO1 encouraged its implementing partners to report on gender breakdown of beneficiaries whenever feasible. For the first time in its R4 reporting, SO1 is able to provide this information. Based on 32 percent of programs providing gender breakdown of beneficiaries, female beneficiaries are 51.96 percent and male beneficiaries are 48.04 percent.

Intermediate Result 3, indicator 3 is “percent of programs that have paid specific attention to avoid the negative impacts of food aid in program design and implementation (do no harm)”. SO1 ensures that programs are designed and implemented following six criteria established by SO1 and implementing partners, reflecting core values in the provision of emergency food aid. One of the criteria is “gender and ethnic equity based on need.” Over 66 percent of programs reported incorporating this value in program design and implementation. This value ranked third in being adopted by programs.

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<sup>4</sup> CARE Guatemala, Final Report



Programs reported that one of the criteria for the selection of activities was the inclusion of women, in as high a proportion as feasible, as decision makers, administrators-supervisors of activities, and as beneficiaries. For example, WFP, a major implementing partner, is committed to the agreements related to gender outlined in the Fourth World Conference on Women, which took place in Beijing in 1995. Its goal is to increase the quality of its food aid by giving direct access to appropriate food to both men and women, and ensuring that women participate in the decision-making process for selecting beneficiaries and modalities for distributing food. This is illustrated in El Salvador during the Hurricane Mitch disaster. WFP reported that in every monitoring and evaluation meeting that took place with NGOs and monitors, and in particular in the workshops, gender awareness and gender orientation objectives were emphasized as central elements. Women were encouraged to participate in community committees in which decisions were made on the nature of the projects, works to be executed, and in planning timetable and food distribution modalities. At the end of the project, women headed 45 of the community committees. Women participation in food-for-work, logistics and administration of food distribution was significant. Monitoring and evaluation instruments included classification of beneficiaries by gender. NGOs reported that 42 percent of beneficiary families was headed by women.<sup>5</sup>

In Tanzania, the involvement of women in the relief or distribution committees has had a considerable empowering effect on women at village level. The female committee members became adept at public speaking, debate and problem solving. 50 percent of the committees are women selected from each sub-village. This is in marked contrast to the previous system used where village government committees (comprised of at least 75 percent males) were responsible for selecting households.<sup>6</sup> (See Annex II, Case Study 2, for more information on community managed targeting)

### **Performance and Prospects:**

Last year, SO1 reported on six performance indicators selected in consultation with implementing partners. Compared to last year's results, the SO1 team improved performance (percentage rating) in five of the six performance indicators. The six performance indicators selected for reporting were SO1 indicators 1 and 2, IR1 indicator 1, IR3 indicators 1 and 2, and IR4 indicator 2. FY 1999 targets were exceeded for five of the six indicators. Four of these indicators (SO1 indicators 1 and 2, IR1 indicator 1, IR3 indicator 1) are maintained for FY 1999 results reporting.

See Table 1 for longer-term performance trends and progress to date since FY 1996. SO1 is consistently on track and incrementally improved its performance (from base of 67 percent to current 82.29 percent) in its main objective to provide for the critical food needs of targeted groups. In addition, there is significant improvement in the percent of programs reporting to have contributed to maintaining or improving nutritional status of beneficiaries, from a base of 37 percent to the current 65.91 percent.

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<sup>5</sup> WFP El Salvador

<sup>6</sup> WFP Tanzania

Where performance needs to be improved, the SO1 team is already making efforts to achieve better results. For example, the SO1 team continues its dialogue with implementing partners in improving reporting on performance indicators. Although SO1 failed to meet its FY 1999 target on percent of cooperating sponsors (programs) meeting reporting requirements, when reports are submitted, they are submitted on a more timely basis compared to last year (50 percent of reports submitted on time compared to last year's 21.62 percent).

SO1 convened its annual meeting with implementing partners (February 3, 2000) to review the results framework and to receive feedback on the process and the tool being used -- standardized reporting questionnaire that incorporates SO1 performance indicators. Implementing partners reported that the reporting questionnaire was useful for their own program management and most of them have adopted it as part of their reporting system. PVO field implementers are now familiar with the questionnaire format and are comfortable in using it. Implementing partners requested modification to the reporting questionnaire to provide some flexibility in due dates for report submission, although efforts will be made to improve this performance. They also requested accommodation for reporting on impact indicators other than nutrition in situations, for example, where programs provide transition support due to failed economies, rather than relief assistance.<sup>7</sup>

The SO1 team is institutionalizing a tracking system to monitor programs more easily. This will be used to follow-up with each implementing partner to improve performance in meeting reporting requirements. Data entry from bi-annual reports using the questionnaire format, and process information such as when reports were due and submitted, will be undertaken as part of ongoing program management. This data will be compiled and analyzed for the Results Review process.

However, if requested funding is not forthcoming, improvement in institutionalizing the Results Review process and tracking of results as part of program management may not be possible. For the tracking system to be implemented, SO1 requires three-person months of technical assistance. In addition, technical assistance to strengthening implementing partners in assessing and improving the nutritional status of beneficiaries will not be possible without additional Development Assistance resource support. (See comments under Table 3, SO1, indicator 2).

Our performance assessment indicated the need to improve the delivery time of food aid commodities. The indicator on pipeline shortage is defined as "food commodities not delivered per schedule agreed to with cooperating sponsors and outlined in FFP call forwards." In FY 1998, the SO1 team pilot tested the pre-positioning of food items with an initial authorization of 9,600 metric tons valued at just over \$6 million. Based on a successful outcome to meet food aid needs in Sudan and Somalia, the pre-positioned stocks were used in FY 1999 in Central America when Hurricane Mitch devastated

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<sup>7</sup> Meeting Minutes, February 18, 2000: Review of BHR/FFP/ER's Results Framework and Reporting, Food Aid Management - February 3, 2000.

Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. The pre-positioning of food aid in U.S. ports, in preparation for sudden-onset emergencies, reduced the time to less than 30 days to provide critical food. The FY 1999 level increased to \$20 million and then to \$30 million or 65,000 metric tons.

The SO1 team also utilized airlifts to expedite food delivery in response to Hurricane Mitch. The management assessment of Hurricane Mitch activities in Honduras and Nicaragua undertaken by the Office of Planning, Program and Evaluation, Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR/PPE) indicated “Overall, FFP’s emergency response immediately after the hurricane was timely and effective.” Airlifted commodities arrived from pre-positioned warehouses within a week after the storm. U.S. military and commercial aircraft were used in the first few weeks after the storm. The rapid and highly visible responses on the part of the U.S. government was recognized and greatly appreciated by host government officials in these countries.<sup>8</sup>

These efforts resulted in an improvement from last year in reduced percentage of programs experiencing pipeline shortages. Although the indicator target was not met, this is considerable progress considering the nature and intensity of mega disasters in FY 1999, with the Kosovo crisis developing soon after the hurricanes in Central America.

#### **Possible Adjustment to Plans:**

For the past two fiscal years, the SO1 team has not reported on its indicator under Intermediate Result 2 that track whether or not proposals are reviewed and cooperating sponsors are notified within 21 business days of proposal receipt. This lack of reporting is due to scarce human resources that sought to meet Agency priorities to respond effectively to high profiled, major disasters. It is SO1 teams’ plan to discontinue this indicator. While the indicator may serve a bureaucratic purpose, it does not impact decisions to respond or not to a humanitarian request. See Annex IV for Updated Results Framework.

#### **Other Donor Programs:**

Title II emergency food aid programs cannot be successfully implemented without the collaboration and assistance of USAID regional bureaus, country missions, and other offices in the Bureau for Humanitarian Response. The major disasters responded to during FY 1999 required extensive coordination with other USAID programs, and with other donors. WFP, a major partner in delivering Title II emergency food aid, receives support from major donors. For example, for the Balkans operation, WFP received contribution from over 20 donors, including the European Commission (ECHO) amounting to over \$81 million. However, the U.S. Government was the largest donor,

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<sup>8</sup> Draft report, May 17, 2000, Bureau for Humanitarian Response, Office of Planning, Program and Evaluation, Management Assessment of Hurricane Mitch Activities in Honduras and Nicaragua.

providing \$45.9 million in food commodities and financial support.<sup>9</sup> Without other donor contribution, the critical food needs of population in large-scale disasters, as in the Balkan region, cannot be met.

The Office of Food for Peace collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) who administers Title I Food for Progress. Food for Progress is supported through three mechanisms, one of which is the use of Section 416(b) commodities. In the Balkans, the "pre-positioning" of 15,000 MT of Title II and 416(b) commodities in the region ensured that adequate food commodities were available to meet needs. In response to Hurricane Mitch, USDA provided Title I government-to-government food aid valued at \$10 million for El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua respectively, and \$15 million for Guatemala. In addition, our 200,000 metric tons of USDA 416 (b) assistance was jointly programmed and evaluated by the Office of Food for Peace and USAID/Indonesia.

For additional illustration of coordination with other programs, see case studies in Annex II.

### **Major Contractors and Grantees:**

Traditional grantees are Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), Aga Khan Foundation (USA), American Red Cross (ARC), Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Church World Services (CWS), Mercy Corps International (MCI), Lutheran World Relief (LWR), Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), Project Concern International (PCI), Relief Society of Tigray (REST), Save the Children (SCF/USA), World Food Programme (WFP) and World Vision, Inc. (WVUS). Key activities are the provision of food to populations in emergency or transition situations through general distribution or food-for-work activities such as repair of houses, rehabilitation of roads and essential infrastructure; supplementary and therapeutic feeding of the malnourished; assessment and surveillance of nutritional status of beneficiaries; building capacity of local groups to manage food aid; and monitoring of food commodities.

The major contractor assisting SO1 is Mendez England and Associates/Advanced Resources Technologies Inc. It provides institutional support for Title II program and administrative backstopping. In addition, through Global Bureau's cooperative agreement with the Academy for Educational Development, the Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance Project (FANTA) provides technical assistance in performance measurement, health and nutrition.

The summary Table 1 below is for internal SO1 management use as it facilitates review of progress to date. The performance indicators highlighted in bold are those selected for results reporting this year.

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<sup>9</sup> The World Food Programme's Balkan Operations, Progress Report No. 2., October – December 1999. Donor contributions as of 31 December 1999.

**TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF SO1 INDICATORS AND RESULTS, FY 1996 - FY 1999  
FY 1999 RESULT COMPARED WITH TARGETS**

Strategic Objective and Intermediate Results	Performance Indicators	FY 1996	FY 1997	FY 1998	FY 1999 Result and Ratings on Indicator Targets	
SO1: Critical Food Needs of Targeted Groups Met	% of targeted population reached by food aid	67% (base)	74.4% Target = 67%	77.34% Target = 70%	82.29% Target = 75%	Exceeded
	% programs reporting change (or maintenance) of nutritional status of target groups	37%	62% Target = 37 %	52.78% Target = 50%	65.91% Target = 55%	Exceeded
IR1: Improved Targeting of Food Aid to the Most Vulnerable Populations	% programs that have instituted a continuous process of needs assessment and recalibration of targeting	53%	85% Target = 55%	87.50% Target = 55%	89.74% Target = 60%	Exceeded
	% programs that have incorporated special needs of different targeted groups	90%	67.5% Target = 90%	70.83% Target = 92%	71.79% Target = 94%	Failed to meet
IR2: Food Aid Delivered to Target Groups on Schedule	% programs experiencing Title II pipeline shortages	30%	33% Target = 30%	47% Target = 25%	41% Target = 20%	Failed to meet
	% proposals reviewed & cooperating sponsors notified of decisions within 21 business days of receipt. <i>Note: This indicator was not tracked due to lack of staff resources</i>	8%	37% Target = 15%	No info Target = 50%	No info Target = 60%	No info
IR3: Improved Planning to Transition Relief Activities to Development	% programs that have developed resettlement or rehabilitation plans to link relief to development	63%	73% Target = 63%	69.44% Target = 63%	77.36% Target = 75%	Exceeded
	% programs that have paid specific attention to avoid the negative impacts of food aid in program design & implementation ("do no harm")	60%	91% Target = 65%	88.89% Target = 70%	88.68% Target = 75%	Exceeded
IR4: Strengthened Capabilities of Cooperating Sponsors & Host Country Entities to Manage Emergency Food Aid Programs	% ISG grants supporting emergency planning/evaluation	44%	deleted	N/A	N/A	N/A
	% programs strengthening counterparts/local groups. <i>Note: Previously, "percent of programs collaborating with local institutions for activity results". Revised June 1999</i>	93%	94% Target = 93%	86.11% Target = 93%	86.79% Target = 95%	Failed to meet
	Percent of cooperating sponsors (programs) able to meet reporting requirements (i.e., submitted all reports due). <i>Note: As in previous years, this does not include timeliness (i.e., within 30 days of reporting period &amp; within 60 days of reporting period for final report). Of those programs meeting the requirements, 50% submitted reports on time (i.e., at least one report on time). This is a significant improvement from last year's 21.62%.</i>	17%	26% Target = 25	56.75% Target = 40	50% Target = 60%	Failed to meet

### *Performance data tables*

Performance data tables for four indicators (highlighted in Table 1) selected for FY 1999 are presented below.

**Table 2: Strategic Objective 1, Indicator 1**  
**Result: Exceeded Expectations**

<b>Percent of targeted population reached by food aid</b>			
Unit of Measurement: Percent (%) of targeted population	Year	Planned	Actual
Data Source: R4 questionnaire/survey	1996	Baseline	67%
	1997	67%	74.4%
Indicator Definition: "Targeted population" as defined at program start and stated in grant document.	1998	70%	77.34%
	1999	75%	82.29%
	2000	80%	
	2001	85%	

#### **Comment:**

As part of its management-for-results efforts, the SO1 team seeks to improve data collection and reporting by its implementing partners, particularly on this key performance indicator. Reporting on performance indicators has been incorporated as part of bi-annual regular reporting. Similar to fiscal years 1997 and 1998, the SO1 team received 100 percent return on the R4 survey questionnaires from its PVO partners. Information (completed R4 survey questionnaires and other reports) available from WFP programs improved significantly during this reporting period, with information missing only for two programs.

Implementing partners, primarily the World Food Programme (WFP) and U.S. PVOs undertook 52 programs (see Annex 1), a significant increase in workload from last year (37 programs). In addition, the SO1 team provided bilateral assistance to Ethiopia and Rwanda. It provided Ethiopia 32,400 metric tons of food commodities, at a total value of over \$8 million, and provided Rwanda 1,650 metric tons valued at \$2 million.

Regional WFP programs, such as the Great Lakes, Sahel and Balkan regions, involve multiple country operations but are reported as one program. Title II emergency food aid was provided to 30 countries through PVOs and WFP's emergency operations (Emergency Operations Plans).

In addition to supporting WFP's emergency operations/EMOPs that involve Transfer Authorizations outlining reporting requirements (and included in performance results review), the Office of Food for Peace contributes to the World Food Programme's Protracted Relief Operations (PROs) and Protracted Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (PRROs). Funding for these are earmarked as pledges. In FY 1999, the Office of Food for Peace contributed 157,277 metric tons of food aid, valued at more than US \$95 million for these operations. An estimated 10,345,900 beneficiaries were planned for in the 19 countries assisted by Title II emergency food aid. The Office of Food for Peace funded

PROs implemented in Africa (Angola, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan). It also funded PRROs implemented in Africa (Guinea, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Uganda), Europe and Eurasia (Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan), Latin America and the Caribbean (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua).<sup>10</sup>

Unless indicated (see Annex 1), implementing partners provided information on number of beneficiaries reached. The SO1 core team undertakes on-site monitoring visits enabling verification of reports. In addition, USAID mission teams monitor project implementation and monitoring of Title II commodities. For example, during the Hurricane Mitch disaster, USAID/Honduras, and other missions in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala provided considerable assistance and their own human resources to monitor Title II emergency food aid program implementation. In Honduras, the excellent assistance provided by the Mission complemented the monitoring visits from SO1.

FY 1999 programs were implemented in Africa (19), Latin America and the Caribbean (13), then Europe and Eurasia (10) and Asia and Near East (10). Beneficiaries *reached* by region are: (a) Africa region: 7,484,543 beneficiaries were reached. This represents 81 percent reached of regional target and 44 percent of global target. (b) Europe and Eurasia: 2,510,889 beneficiaries were reached, representing 91 percent reached of regional target and 15 percent of global target. (c) Latin America and the Caribbean: 2,394,760 beneficiaries were reached, representing 94 percent reached of regional target and 14 percent of global target. (d) Asia and Near East: 1,661,974 beneficiaries were reached, representing 64 percent reached of regional target and 10 percent of global target.

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<sup>10</sup> FY 1999 Pledge Status Report, as of October 12, 1999, BHR/FFP; WFP Status of 2000 Food Aid Needs and Shortfalls for Emergency and Protracted Relief Operations, as of 11 April 2000

**Table 3: Strategic Objective 1, Indicator 2**  
**Result: Exceeded Expectations**

<b>Change (or maintenance) in nutritional status of target groups</b>			
Unit of Measurement: Percent (%) of programs  Data Source: R4 questionnaire/survey  Indicator Definition: % of programs* reporting change or maintenance of nutritional status of target groups  *Excluded programs that had impact indicators other than nutritional status.	Year	Planned	Actual
	1996	Baseline	37%
	1997	37%	62%
	1998	50%	52.78%
	1999	55%	65.91%
	2000	60%	
	2001	65%	

**Comment:**

Data provided by implementing partners are not separately verified. Both primary (collected and analyzed by implementing partner) and secondary data are provided. Implementing partners have been encouraged to partner with agencies that are competent in this area or to strengthen their technical skills, depending on interest and technical capacity. There is interest in improving skills and learning new methodologies, for example, in integrating crude mortality rate data collection with nutrition surveys.<sup>11</sup>

SO1 implementing partners require technical assistance to strengthen their capacity in assessing and analyzing nutritional status, and in the integration of crude mortality rate data for more accurate interpretation of nutrition data (as those too malnourished die). A pilot test to integrate crude mortality rate data with nutrition survey revealed problems in analysis, rendering crude mortality rate results unreliable for reporting. One approach for progress in this area would be to provide specifications for software that analyzes and reports survey data, including the incorporation and integration of crude mortality rate, and to provide a standard tool to analyze and report anthropometric and crude mortality rate data. Once a standard tool is developed (second year), training on survey methodology, analysis and reporting can be undertaken. This will require an estimated six-person months over two years for review and development of the indicator, and initial training of PVOs and assistance with surveys. No Development Assistance funding is currently available.

Illustrative nutrition data received from implementing partners are included in Annex II, Case Study 1.

<sup>11</sup> Meeting Minutes, February 18, 2000: Review of BHR/FFP/ER's Results Framework and Reporting, Food Aid Management - February 3, 2000.



**Table 4: Immediate Result 1, Indicator 1**  
**Result: Exceeded Expectations**

<b>Percent of programs that have instituted a continuous process of needs assessment and recalibration of targeting</b>			
Unit of Measurement: Percent (%) of programs  Data Source: R4 questionnaire/survey  Indicator Definition: % of programs that undertake needs assessment semi-annually (only for programs of duration more than 6 months)	Year	Planned	Actual
	1996	Baseline	53%
	1997	55%	85%
	1998	55%	87.50%
	1999	60%	89.74%
	2000	65%	
	2001	65%	

**Comment:**

Data provided for this performance indicator are not verified. Implementing partners utilize a variety of needs assessment tools and methodologies to determine food needs and identify vulnerable groups.

Should Development Assistance resources become available, it is the SO1 team's plan to work with implementing partners to review current practices. Based on this finding, determination could be made if common standards and methodologies, or the collection of a set of essential information, could be integrated to ongoing practices. An estimated three-person months for review and discussion with implementing partners will be required.

Annex II, Case Study 2, provides an illustrative example of how programs undertake needs assessments to readjust targeted levels of emergency food aid.

**Table 5: Immediate Result 3, Indicator 1**  
**Result: Exceeded Expectations**

<b>Percent of programs that developed resettlement or rehabilitation plans to link relief to development or relief exit strategies</b>			
Unit of Measurement: Percent (%) of programs  Data Source: R4 questionnaire/survey  Indicator Definition: % of programs that plan <u>and</u> implement plans	Year	Planned	Actual
	1996	Baseline	63%
	1997	63%	73%
	1998	63%	69.44%
	1999	75%	77.36%
	2000	80%	
	2001	85%	

**Comment:**

Although data for this performance indicator is “as reported” by implementing partners, the majority of programs incorporate relief-to-development strategies in program planning and implementation. Annex II, Case Study 3, illustrates a successful transition from relief to development in the context of Liberia. SO1 also contributes to the relief to development efforts in nine of the ten Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) countries (see Annex III).

## FISCAL YEAR 2002 RESOURCE REQUEST

### PART III. RESOURCE REQUEST

Funds available to support P.L. 480 Title II programming in FY 2000 include a total of approximately \$951 million of Title II resources (including base and supplemental appropriation as well as a transfer from Title I) (**does not include \$10.0 million Farmer to Farmer**) and \$5.1 million of Development Assistance (DA) resources. These resources have been allocated between the two Office Strategic Objective (SO) Teams for further distribution to the individual activities which support each SO. To date in FY 2000, the SO#1 Team has been allocated approximately \$500 million of Title II resources to respond to emergency food aid requirements around the world. The total Title II allocation thus far in FY 2000 for the SO#2 Team was approximately \$451 million. The Administration is requesting \$837 million of Title II resources each year for both FY 2001 and FY 2002. It is anticipated that the percentage of Title II resources allocated to each of the two SO Teams during both FY 2001 and FY 2002 will remain similar to the percentage split in FY 2000.

The \$5.1 million of DA resources provided to the Office in FY 2000 continued to be pivotal to the success of all Title II activities. Approximately half of those resources were provided to our PVO/NGO Cooperating Sponsors (CSs) to assist them with training and technical assistance activities, as well as funding to complement their food aid resources and make their Title II non-emergency activities truly effective and sustainable. Such grants are used by PVOs to hire and train staff, procure equipment and supplies, provide training and technical assistance to their in-country local counterparts, as well as design, manage, monitor and evaluate their activities. The balance of the DA funds was used to provide technical assistance and institutional support to the Office in the timely and efficient management of the Title II resources.

Today, Cooperating Sponsors who have received modest additional funding, TA and training from BHR/FFP, are now expected to use their limited FFP provided dollar grants to meet an ever growing set of costly technical and programmatic requirements. These new requirements necessitate the hiring of technically trained sector, M&E, and environmental staff and consultants for PVO headquarters and/or field sites and the completion of baseline surveys, midterm and final evaluations, as well as environmental reviews. In addition, these resources are used to provide adequate TA, training and backstopping to CS field sites to ensure that activities are on track and technical concerns are being addressed. As a result of the increasing complexity of Title II activities and the continued shortage of support resources, CSs have increasingly expressed their concerns to BHR/FFP that they cannot keep doing more with less. If they are required to meet higher Title II design, approval, and performance monitoring and reporting standards, they have clearly stated that additional funding will be required.

In addition to the factors that inhibit the ability of the CSs to effectively manage and strengthen their activities, a number of factors continue to influence the ability of the Office to strengthen its internal capacities and those of its partners. In the face of resource demands that greatly exceed the current supply, the Agency has been unable to

change the relative priority placed on food security and food aid programming. Regional bureaus and Missions have not been able to increase the staff devoted to the management of the Title II activities as they continue to focus their staff resources on the management of their DA resources. In fact, indications are that critical Backstop 15 (FFPO) positions may be cut by the regional bureaus in their FY 2002 R4s. In addition, the Office's efforts to enhance its results-based management of Title II resources through the two SO Teams continues to be hampered by inadequate staff and OE resources. These constraints are compounded by the challenges of managing multiple, and often conflicting, mandates and other external influences such as the desire to rationalize the proportion of Title II resources that are monetized. Finally, efforts to coordinate Title II activities with USDA's Section 416(b) and Food for Progress activities have significantly increased workload burdens in the areas of policy dialogue, country allocation, and logistics coordination.

In response to these challenges, the Office will continue its efforts to efficiently utilize the staff and OE resources provided by the Agency. As part of this effort the Office will continue its reorganization plans in order to allocate its scarce staff resources to functions that are critically short of support. In FY 2000, the Office took several steps in the Office reorganization process by making the difficult decision to shift one staff position from a "Special Assistant" role to that of a country backstop officer (CBO) in SO#2. In addition, two clerical positions were eliminated and, in their place, two new CBO positions were added – one on each SO Team. These shifts of positions were initiated only after an extensive review of the trade-off between functions gained versus functions lost. Although the loss of the "special assistant" position and two secretarial positions would cost the Office efficiency in certain areas, the addition of three CBO slots was vital to the ability of both the SO#1 and SO#2 Teams to manage their continuously expanding portfolios.

In addition to the Office reorganization efforts, the SO#2 Team intends to begin the process of updating its Strategic Objective during FY 2001. The SO2 Team will concentrate on "getting the right food to the right people in the right place at the right time," our clear Congressional mandate. In doing so the Team will stress lifting the maximum amount of food from American farms while striving for the maximum possible food security impact of P.L. 480 funded activities. We believe that the reformulated SO will require the resource levels outlined in this request.

### **Resource Request for FY 2001 and FY 2002**

The Office requests the following staff, OE and DA increases in order to ensure adequate financial and programmatic accountability while simultaneously supporting cooperating sponsor efforts to design and implement Title II activities that will have a demonstrable and measurable impact on food insecurity. The request level for each resource is identified for the aggregate Office level request. Disaggregate request levels are then provided for each SO Team.

#### **A. Workforce Requirements**

## **A.1. Direct Hire Workforce**

<b>FY 2000</b>	<b>27 Direct Hire Positions</b>
<b>FY 2001</b>	<b>29 Direct Hire Positions</b>
<b>FY 2002</b>	<b>29 Direct Hire Positions</b>

In FY 2000, the SO#1 and SO#2 Teams managed approximately 124 individual activities with a total Country Backstop Officer FTE complement of 18 (12 direct hire CBOs and 6 program funded PSCs). This CBO complement represents an increase in CBO staffing over FY 1999 due to the addition of one (1) CBO slot late in the fiscal year when SO#2 gained one CBO to increase the total number of SO#2 CBOs to seven. This additional CBO position in SO#2 did not reflect the infusion of additional staff resources into BHR/FFP, but rather a reallocation of staff positions within the office. The seven CBOs in SO#2 are currently responsible for supporting 94 activities valued at more than \$400 million in Title II resources. Despite the office restructuring and the resulting addition of one additional CBO to the SO#2 team, the SO2 Team continues to face serious activity management issues that are adversely influenced by a number of factors. As an example, food security is a poorly understood, complex, multi-sectoral field that requires unique development skills. In addition, FFP does its own grant making (rather than relying on M/OP). Finally, food aid management requires unique skills in commodity procurement, transport and agricultural market analysis.

Not only is the workload to staff ratio high and the nature of the work complex, but the SO2 Team's ability to adequately manage its resources is being further jeopardized by the following:

- P.L. 480 Legislation allows Title II PVOs to work in non-USAID presence countries. These programs must be managed from Washington by the SO2 Team and currently include activities in Chad, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea Bissau and Mauritania. Activities in non-presence countries are also expected to increase as FFP encourages CSs to "grow" the Title II development program in sub-Saharan Africa;
- Although with reduced DA funding resources more Missions are interested in Title II, most Missions are being downsized and do not have adequate staff to backstop Title II activities. A number of Missions in food insecure countries in Africa are reluctant to consider development of new Title II activities in their countries without in-house management capacity;
- Several countries, including Angola, Rwanda, and Liberia are transitioning from emergency to non-emergency food aid programs; and
- As the new School Feeding initiative and the new LIFE Initiative continue to be operationalized, the SO2 Team's workload will increase.

To adequately address the critical problems addressed above and for SO#2 to effectively manage its Title II resources and achieve the results while modifying its Strategic Plan, the Team clearly needs an increased number of direct hire staff. Therefore, the SO#2 Team is requesting two new project officers to work full time on SO#2. As currently envisioned, the two new full time project officers needed are:

- (1) A country backstop officer to assume responsibility for activities in West Africa.

- (2) A country backstop officer to assume responsibility for activities in up to three countries, as well as serve as the Office's technical assistance and training coordinator. The latter will serve as a liaison with the technical offices in the Global Bureau (Health/Nutrition and Ag/Food Security) whose contracts SO#2 plans to buy into for technical support. This person should also have expertise in food security technical areas, which will continue as a critical focus of the SO#2 Team's institutional strengthening support.

In addition to the additional staffing requirements for SO#2, the SO#1 Team also has additional staffing requirements that are necessary for the effective management of its program resources. In particular, SO#1 continues to be vulnerable to staff shortages when responding to even one major food emergency. Past experience with the responses in Central America (Hurricane Mitch), Kosovo, and East Timor has clearly demonstrated that as much as 50 percent of the SO#1 staff must be diverted from ongoing emergency program backstopping for adequate management of a complex food emergency. In FY 2000, the staff drain associated with the massive food emergency in the Horn of Africa has again stressed the SO#1 management capabilities to the limit. Four additional positions have been identified as critical to give the SO#1 Team the ability to effectively respond to more than one major food emergency at one time:

- 1) Two (2) new CBO position to assume country specific activity responsibilities. These positions would reduce the number of countries and activities that each CBO must manage. In addition, it would provide more flexibility for CBOs to TDY, participate on DART Teams, and provide support to the Bureau Ops center.
- 2) One (1) POD Emergency Response Specialist to backstop emergency freight accounts, ITSH pipelines, and associated NMS actions.
- 3) One (1) Information Officer for the management of Title II information and correspondence requirements. In particular during major emergency food aid activities, the effective management of information can be critical to the Office, Bureau, and Agency.

The Office is formally requesting direct hire slots for just two (2) of the six (6) additional positions described above. The four (4) remaining positions are being requested through other hiring mechanisms described below. If the Agency is unable to provide even the two (2) additional direct hire slots through increased direct hire FTEs, it is strongly requested that alternative options be authorized for those positions as well. Options to consider include NEP, PMIs, AAAS Fellows, expanded institutional contractor support (including computer access and co-location in the RRB), and/or PSCs, with a requisite level of funding. In addition, a number of key Congressional offices have acknowledged that additional staffing resources are needed for BHR/FFP to increase the timely and effective programming of Title II resources. BHR senior management could also discuss with USAID's Legislative office the viability of adding

language to the P.L.480 appropriation that would provide the authority to use a modest amount of Title II funding for administrative purposes.

## **A.2. Program Funded Workforce**

**FY 2000      6 OFDA funded SO#1 PSCs**  
**Total   6 PSCs**

**FY 2001      6 OFDA funded SO#1 PSCs plus**  
**4 Title II funded SO#1 PSCs**  
**3 Title II funded SO#2 PSCs**  
**Total   13 PSCs**

**FY 2002      3 OFDA funded SO#1 PSCs plus**  
**7 Title II funded SO#1 PSCs**  
**3 Title II funded SO#2 PSCs**  
**Total   13 PSCs**

As mentioned in the discussion of Direct Hire Workforce levels, Congressional staffers have identified legislative authorities currently available to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) that provide resources for the USDA's administration of the Title I program. If similar authorities were made available to USAID for the administration of Title II resources, then USAID would have the capability of hiring personal services contractors (PSC) to support both the SO#1 and SO#2 teams. If this new legislative authority is granted, the Office is requesting approval to hire seven (7) new Title II funded PSCs in FY 2001 and ten (10) new PSCs in FY 2002. By phasing in the hiring of Title II funded PSCs, the Office would be both verifying the permanence of the new authorities and allowing a rational phase-out of the IDA/OFDA funded PSC contracts.

Both the SO#1 and SO#2 Teams are in critical need of these additional PSC resources for a number of reasons. In addition to the justification provided for the additional direct hire slots requested, there is little argument from our Title II partners that both of the SO Teams are severely understaffed to manage the resource levels in their respective portfolios. In managing any major food emergency, the SO#1 team is currently forced to focus its limited staff on the management of the emergency at hand. Multiple team members working on one emergency plus the allocation of staff for temporary duties overseas often leaves other Title II emergency actions under managed. In addition, the effectiveness of both SO Teams is hampered by a lack of qualified technical experts on the staff. The authority to hire PSC technical experts would enable both teams to substantially strengthen their management capabilities.

## **B. Operating Expense (Non-Personnel) Requirements**

In addition to the workforce requirements described above, both SO Teams request increases in the level of OE funds for travel and support services. Late in FY 2000, SO#1 will be filling three direct hire vacancies that will add to the Team requirements for travel

resources. Additional travel funds will be needed by the SO#2 Team for increased CBO travel in support of: a) increased numbers of activities in non-presence countries and those with limited Mission capacity; b) the evaluation of mission's food security strategy revisions and new activity designs; and c) several programs transitioning from emergency to development food aid.

**Budget Table 1: Operating Expense Requirements  
(Thousands of Dollars)**

<b>Operating Expense</b>	<b>FY 2000 Actual</b>	<b>FY 2001 Request</b>	<b>FY 2002 Request</b>
<b>Travel</b>			
1. Travel for site visits, reviews and evaluations	\$100.00	\$200.00	\$200.00
2. Travel to conferences and BHR/FFP field workshops	\$ 60.00	\$204.00	\$204.00
<b>Travel Subtotal:</b>	<b>\$160.00</b>	<b>\$404.00</b>	<b>\$404.00</b>
<b>Services</b>			
3.a Management & Professional Services	\$ 16.00	\$ 36.00	\$ 36.00
3.b Supplies and Services	\$ 6.00	\$ 26.50	\$ 26.50
<b>Services Subtotal:</b>	<b>\$ 22.00</b>	<b>\$ 62.50</b>	<b>\$ 62.50</b>
<b>TOTAL NON-PERSONNEL OPERATIONAL EXPENSE BUDGET:</b>	<b>\$182.00</b>	<b>\$466.50</b>	<b>\$466.50</b>

Specifically, the line items in Budget Table 1 would be used for:

- (1) Travel for site visits, to participate in DAP and PAA reviews, to provide technical assistance to Missions and CS partners, and to backstop activities in “non-presence” countries. Additionally, because many Title II activities are due for mid-term and final evaluations in the next few years; therefore, increased travel funds are needed in FY 2001 and FY 2002 to allow adequate FFP participation on the evaluation teams. This is critical for assessing the effectiveness and impact of Title II activities, and for determining the influence of monitoring for results on FFP's development programs;
- (2) Travel to international conferences and workshops to: (a) increase coordination with other donors, and (b) conduct two food aid manager training workshops one in Washington and one in the field; and
- (3) Management supplies and services for computer hardware and software – this is critical for maintaining FFP's information system for tracking P.L. 480 commodities, since it is separate from the Agency's computer system and support, and not part of the New Management System (NMS).



### C. Development Assistance (DA) Resource Requirements

The Office of Food for Peace received \$5.1 million of DA resources to support an \$961 million food aid budget for FY 2000. This very modest amount of DA resources has proven insufficient to support the design and implementation of Title II activities associated with such a large amount of program resources and cannot be expected to effectively promote efficient management of the program resources and demonstrable results. Although some progress has been made in strengthening the review, approval and design of developmental food aid programs, much more needs to be done, as described in the following sections.

#### Overview of DA-Supported Activities:

**Budget Table 2: Office Development Assistance Requirements**  
(Thousands of Dollars)

Development Assistance Type	Actual FY 2000	Request FY 2001	Request FY 2002
1. FFP Institutional & Administrative Support Contract	\$1,501.00	\$2,711.00	\$2,711.00
2. Institutional Support Agreements	\$2,363.00	\$4,329.00	\$4,329.00
3. Technical Assistance and Training	\$1,088.00	\$ 650.00	\$ 650.00
4. Child Survival Fellow	\$ 148.00	\$ 190.00	\$ 190.00
5. Other	\$ 0.00	\$ 0.00	\$ 0.00
<b>TOTAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE</b>	<b>\$5,100.00</b>	<b>\$7,880.00</b>	<b>\$7,880.00</b>

**Budget Table 2a: SO#1 Development Assistance Requirements**  
(Thousands of Dollars)

Development Assistance Type	Actual FY 2000	Request FY 2001	Request FY 2002
1. FFP Institutional & Administrative Support Contract	\$ 470.00	\$1,211.00	\$1,211.00
2. Institutional Support Agreements	\$ 869.00	\$ 819.00	\$ 769.00
3. Technical Assistance and Training	\$ 150.00	\$ 200.00	\$ 250.00
4. Child Survival Fellow	\$ 30.00	\$ 30.00	\$ 30.00
5. Other	\$ 0.00		
<b>TOTAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE</b>	<b>\$1,519.00</b>	<b>\$2,260.00</b>	<b>\$2,260.00</b>

**Budget Table 2b: SO#2 Development Assistance Requirements  
(Thousands of Dollars)**

<b>Development Assistance Type</b>	<b>Actual FY 2000</b>	<b>Request FY 2001</b>	<b>Request FY 2002</b>
1. FFP Institutional & Administrative Support Contract	\$1,031.00	\$1,500.00	\$1,500.00
2. Institutional Support Agreements	\$1,494.00	\$3,460.00	\$3,460.00
3. Technical Assistance and Training	\$ 938.00	\$ 500.00	\$ 500.00
4. Child Survival Fellow	\$ 118.00	\$ 160.00	\$ 160.00
5. Other	\$ 0.00		
<b>TOTAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE</b>	<b>\$3,581.00</b>	<b>\$5,620.00</b>	<b>\$5,620.00</b>

**(1) FFP Institutional Support Contract: \$2,711,000**

Technical support to both SO Teams is currently provided through a contract with Mendez England & Associates. This support contract is due to expire during the late Spring of FY 2001. BHR/FFP is in the process of drafting a new scope of work for the follow-on contract that will respond to some of the weaknesses identified in the current contract scope. In particular, SO#2 has identified the need for two new senior analyst positions to provide higher level technical and programmatic guidance to the SO#2 CBOs. In general, the institutional support contract remains a critical component for BHR/FFP by assisting in a number of administrative and information services. These services include commodity and logistics tracking, information system management, assistance in administering grant programs and organizing program reviews, and organization of conferences and training workshops such as the Food Aid Managers Course offered annually for USAID Washington and field staff.

**(2) Institutional Support Assistance (ISAs): \$4,229,000**

Institutional Support Assistance (previously called Institutional Support Grants) are a key resource for providing our implementing partners with the necessary dollar resources to achieve the following:

- a) Strengthen CS headquarters and/or regional level institutional and technical capacity to design and manage technically sound and appropriate food security interventions; to manage for results; to account for Title II commodities; and to better design, target and manage food aid activities. This includes building the capacity of PVOs to: develop monitoring and evaluation systems; conduct Bellmon analyses and manage commodity monetization activities; design technically appropriate and sound sector activities that have a demonstrable impact on enhanced food security; and adapt and test methodologies or tools to transition from emergency to development programs.

- b) Improve collaboration amongst CSs implementing Title II activities, and between CSs and Missions doing integrated programming in specific countries. This includes encouraging CS partners to jointly develop or improve tools, methodologies, expertise and monitoring and evaluation systems; fostering collaboration and joint planning between CSs and Missions, international organizations and other donors, including integration of non-food resources; and encouraging mentoring of smaller CSs by larger, more experienced organizations;
- c) Conduct needs assessments and design programs in new countries or regions where CS is not currently implementing activities, particularly South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa; and develop innovative approaches to initiate new activities in least developed (LDC) and low-income, food deficit countries (LIFDCs); and
- d) Support a food aid coordinating/collaborative body representing the Title II Cooperating Sponsors.

### **Current Funding of ISAs**

During FY 2000, BHR/FFP is utilizing approximately \$2.4 million of its DA allocation to support the ISAs for all Title II CSs, supporting development and emergency programming. Of that amount, the SO#2 Team is providing approximately \$1.5 million toward ISA support. Because the overall level of DA available to BHR/FFP is inadequate to meet office requirements, FFP is using approximately \$2.6 million of its P.L. 480 Title II Section 202(e) funds to support ISA cooperative agreements, bringing the Office funding total to \$5 million. FFP awarded 14 multi-year cooperative agreements late in FY 1998 and is seeking full DA funding in both FY 2001 and 2002 for the \$4.3 million mortgage. SO#2 is expecting to provide \$4,000,000 out of its DA allocation in both of those years.

It is also important to note that USAID's PVO partners contend that the limited availability of ISA resources will hamper their ability to design new food aid development activities, since design of new initiatives requires an extensive investment of staff time, travel funds and technical analyses that are critical to assess a host country's food security problems and propose appropriate interventions to address them.

### **(3) Technical Assistance and Training and JHU Fellow: \$940,000**

**FFP's surveys of Missions and CSs technical assistance needs identified a broad range of support requirements.**

- a) CSs are in need of support in problem analysis, program design and strategic planning, particularly as it relates to the unique, cross sector nature of food security programming. Such expertise needs to be build up at CS headquarters and field offices.
- b) CSs are seeking concrete guidance and access to tested models on many food aid specific activities, including commodity and ration selection, Bellmon

determinations, monetization best practices, weaning foods and beneficiary targeting. Operations research will need to be carried out to develop models and protocols in some of these areas.

- c) Missions are interested in accessing support in food security strategic planning and program integration, in seeing a more formal structure to food security/food aid programming; and in seeing greater synergy between programs in health, nutrition, agriculture and income generation – all sector programs that affect food security.
- d) BHR/FFP, Missions and CSs require ongoing access to expertise in monitoring and evaluation (M&E), including a review of the relevance and application of food security monitoring and impact indicators developed this far, an assessment of existing M&E tools that are easy to use in PVO-type programs, field testing of the indicator guides developed under the **G/HN Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance** (FANta) Project, and examination of appropriate qualitative indicators for food security programs. Additionally, there is further work required on development of indicators in Natural Resources Management (NRM), Micro-enterprise, Education and institutional strengthening.
- e) BHR/FFP needs greater access to technical expertise in the review of CS proposals, Results Reports, Bellmon Analyses and Monetization plans, as well as Mission strategic plan and R4s, and other required documents. Although technical support is sometimes available within the Agency for Title II proposal reviews, Agency participation in our review processes is irregular.
- f) BHR/FFP requires greater assistance in: (1) improving linkages between relief and development; and (2) developing long-term strategies (internally and with other donors) for food security programming in critical regions, such as the Greater Horn of Africa and the Sahel.

In order to address the broad technical assistance and training needs described above, FFP proposes to access assistance through the following Global Bureau contract mechanisms in FY 2001, with the levels proposed:

**a) Project: \$540,000**

In recent years the SO2 Team has been accessing a modest level of technical assistance from the Global Bureau's Office of Health and Nutrition, currently through the Food and Nutrition SO2 FY 2002 Request for FANTA Technical Assistance (FANTA) project. FANTA activities support both SO1 and SO2 within FFP, providing technical assistance to FFP, Field Missions and Cooperating Sponsors. FANTA activities have been divided into three separate intermediate results (IR) designed to correspond to the FFP strategic plan. FANTAs Strategic Objective is **improved food and nutrition policy, strategy, and program development**.

FANTA will be operating under obligations from FY 2000 where a total of \$988,000 of DA resources is being provided by the Office. This amount is approximately 30 percent greater than the amount provided in FY 1999 due to a one-time increase in funding from the SO2 Team. As discussed under the section describing Office workforce requirements, the SO2 Team has identified an increasing need for technical guidance in many of the sectoral areas targeted with Title II resources. In addition to the sectoral support, FANTA also has provided support to both SO Teams through: training sessions at the annual Food Aid Manager's course; provision of issues papers related to both SO1 and SO2 PVO proposals; review of FFP documents such as the 1999 U.S. International Food Assistance Report; review of proposals for the food fortification workshop and the ACC/SCN; assistance with the development of the FFP/ER R4; and the provision of technical support to USAID/Luanda in results reporting for SO1 programs.

The FANTA program proposes a significant level of support to FFP's SO1 and SO2 Teams over the next five years. The following activities were put forward in the FANTA workplan for FY 1999 and are illustrative of the range of support envisioned for FY 2000, FY 2001, and beyond.

- a) **Core support to SO1 and SO2.** *The core activities include, but are not limited to: provision of assistance to FFP, Cooperating Sponsors (CSs), and field Missions in designing, implementing, and evaluating Title II activities. This support consists of technical reviews of all new DAPs, DAP Amendments and Annual Results Reports, technical review of ISA annual plans and M&E systems, collection of information and analysis for the SO1 and SO2 Results Reports, designing and participating in monitoring and evaluation regional workshops for CSs, and research and analysis leading to draft policy papers for FFP consideration.*
- b) **Development of access indicator for SO2.** *Over the past several years, CSs have requested assistance in the development of easily collectable indicators of access to food, to replace more costly consumption data. FANTA subcontractors Cornell and Tufts Universities will validate the USDA domestic food security survey instrument for developing country situations in up to three countries, two of which will be partially funded by FFP. Tom Marchione in PPE will be the BHR point person with FANTA for this effort.*
- c) **Development of food ration guide.** *FANTA has reviewed best practices in the implementation of supplementary feeding programs in the literature and in two South American Title II programs. The program recommendations that have resulted show promise for improving food security impact. The recommendations need to be tested in other regions and validated prior to the issuance of a best practice food ration guide. Assistance will consist of extensive consultation and workshops in up to 3 countries, in addition to close monitoring of nutrition impact in programs that adopt the recommendations.*
- d) **Assessment of the impact of Title II programs and lessons learned.** *Five years into the implementation of the Agency's Food Aid and Food Security Policy Paper and with an anticipated turnover of a third of the ongoing DAPs in the coming year, the time is opportune to examine our accomplishments and validate the continued relevance of the Policy Paper. The assessment would look at achievements by sector, and explore the endogenous and exogenous factors which have influenced outcomes through an extensive review of results reports and evaluations, and the development of case studies, culminating in a high-level review meeting designed to raise the profile of this important resource.*
- b) **SO2 FY 2002 Request for G/EGAD Food Security II Cooperative Agreement with Michigan State University: \$110,000**

Under its Cooperative Agreement with USAID, Michigan State University (MSU)'s Department of Agricultural Economics, has continued to strengthen the capacities of USAID missions, host country governments, and participating eligible Title II organizations, to factor the economics of food production and marketing into interventions designed to promote food security. Areas of geographic concentration continue to be the Horn, Sahel, and vulnerable regions of Southern Africa.

MSU will be operating under obligations from FY 2000 where a total of \$110,000 of DA resources are being provided by the Office. These funds have allowed USAID Missions, BHR/FFP, and Cooperating Sponsors (CS) to address key food aid policy and procedural questions on a sound, empirical basis. The key questions have included:

- **how food aid programs facilitate the transition from relief and development;**
- **how improved targeting of food aid reaches the most chronically food-insecure populations in selected sub-Saharan countries and regions;**
- **what the proper role of food aid is and what its impact is on food markets;**
- **what the most cost-effective approaches are to food aid monetization;**
- **what the role of food aid is in promoting agricultural input intensification;**
- **how strengthening food aid “complementarity” between health, nutrition, demography and agricultural transformation is achieved; and**
- **how CSs participate in decentralized agricultural marketing information systems.**

MSU will build on the above research findings and networks in sub-Saharan Africa to undertake impact studies of Title II food aid monetization activities, over a period of 15 months. The impact studies will be conducted in three countries, Mozambique, Rwanda and Uganda, subject to confirmation and prior concurrence of USAID Missions in those countries. One interim report and a summary of preliminary findings that will guide the longer analytical effort, will be provided after approximately 3 months.

MSU will also be working in collaboration with FANTA to develop access indicators. MSU's work in the development of economic indicators as proxy for nutritional indicators will support and compliment the FANTA activities. These activities have already begun through work in Mozambique and are being further tested in Kenya. In addition to these sites MSU will test this model in the two to three sites as the FANTA access indicator field activities.

In addition, research papers are to be delivered on monetization and regional markets, explaining opportunities for private sector involvement in the West and Coastal African regional monetization, and analyzing food aid impacts on local food grain marketing. The transfer of skills to USAID and CS field staff takes place through in-country and regional workshops and training events related to the design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of Title II activities.

- c) SO2 FY 2002 Request for G/HN Johns Hopkins University Health and Child Survival Fellow: \$190,000

The Office's health and nutrition technical support is through the Johns Hopkins University (JHU) Health and Child Survival Fellowship program, using DA funding. Given that the SO2 Team allocates half of its budget to support programs in maternal and child health and nutrition and water and sanitation, the addition of a full time JHU fellow in FY 2000 has been invaluable. Continuation of funding for a JHU fellow is essential. If insufficient DA is provided for this purpose, USDH levels and other alternatives should be re-evaluated.

## SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION ANNEXES

### ANNEX 1: FY 1999 BENEFICIARIES REACHED VERSUS TARGETED BY REGION, COUNTRY & IMPLEMENTING PARTNER

AUDIENCE: SO1 TEAM, IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS, USAID MISSIONS

Country	Partner	Targeted	Reached	Not Reached	No info
<b>A. AFRICA</b>					
Ethiopia	REST	150,000	150,000	-	-
	WFP	1,200,000	1,200,000 (actual: 3,000,000)	-	-
Ethiopia total: 2 programs		1,350,000	1,350,000	-	-
Great Lakes regional (Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania)	WFP	1,200,000	1,200,000 (actual: 1,380,000)	-	-
Guinea	WFP	200,000	200,000	-	-
Liberia	CRS	89,200	61,765	27,435	-
Sahel regional (Cape Verde, Gambia, Senegal, Mauritania)	WFP	1,040,000	-	-	1,040,000
Sierra Leone	CARE	109,820	109,820	-	-
	CRS	50,500	43,428	7,072	-
	WVUS	329,729	329,729 (actual: 348,093)	-	-
Sierra Leone total: 3 programs		490,049	482,977	7,072	-
Somalia	CARE	250,000	250,000 (actual: 451,400)	-	-
Sudan	ADRA	11,840	11,840 (actual: 18,301)	-	-
	CRS	143,700	143,700	-	-
	LWR	115,000	115,000	-	-
	NPA	120,365	120,365 (actual: 124,984)	-	-
	WFP	2,360,000	1,770,000	590,000	-
	WVUS	127,519	127,519	-	-
Sudan total: 5 programs		2,878,424	2,288,424	590,000	-
Tanzania	WFP	792,000	792,000 (actual: 792,558)	-	-
Uganda	WFP	512,000	503,814	8,186	-
Zambia	WFP	406,272	355,563	50,709	-

Country	Partner	Targeted	Reached	Not Reached	No info
<b>AFRICA total</b>		9,207,945	7,484,543 (81.3%)	683,402 (7.4%)	1,040,000 (11.3%)
<b>B. ASIA &amp; NEAR EAST</b>					
Indonesia	ADRA	22,000	22,000 (actual: 28,000)	-	-
	CARE	143,610	143,610 (actual: 152,735)	-	-
	CRS	145,712	145,712 (actual: 147,918)	-	-
	CRS/ Interfaith	360,000	283,389	76,611	-
	CWS	37,000	37,000 (actual: 37,720)	-	-
	MCI	42,000	34,683	7,317	
	WFP	312,000	-	-	312,000
	WVUS	20,580	20,580	-	-
Indonesia total: 8 programs		1,082,902	686,974	83,928	312,000
North Korea	WFP (PVO monitoring)	1,500,000	975,000 *	525,000	
North Korea total: 2 programs					
<b>ASIA total</b>		2,582,902	1,661,974 (64.34%)	608,928 (23.58%)	312,000 (12.08%)
<b>C. EUROPE &amp; EURASIA</b>					
Afghanistan	AKF USA	279,382	240,133	39,249	-
Balkans regional (Albania, Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, FRY)	ARC	55,000	55,000 (actual: 55,369)	-	-
	CRS	102,300	102,300	-	-
	MCI	262,500	262,500 (actual: 282,457)	-	-
	WFP	1,825,000	1,642,500**	182,500	-
Balkans regional total: 4 programs		2,244,800	2,062,300	182,500	
Bosnia	ADRA	59,900	59,900	-	-
	ARC	55,000	53,000	2,000	-
	CRS	28,365	17,658	10,707	
Bosnia total: 3 programs		143,265	130,558	12,707	
Bulgaria	ARC	60,000	60,000	-	-
	CRS	20,000	17,898	2,102	-
Bulgaria total: 2 programs		80,000	77,898	2,102	-



Country	Partner	Targeted	Reached	Not Reached	No info
<b>EUROPE &amp; EURASIA total</b>		2,747,447	2,510,889 (91.39%)	236,558 (8.61%)	-
<b>E. LATIN AMERICA &amp; CARIBBEAN</b>					
Dominican Republic	ARC	155,000	155,000	-	-
	WFP	320,000	320,000 (actual: 373,000)	-	-
Dom Republic total: 2 programs		475,000	475,000	-	-
El Salvador	WFP	60,000	60,000	-	-
Guatemala	CARE	37,000	34,322	2,678	
	CRS	132,000	112,362	19,638	-
	WFP	65,000	65,000	-	-
Guatemala total: 3 programs		234,000	211,684	22,316	
Honduras	CARE	530,000	410,000	120,000	-
	CRS	100,000	100,000	-	-
	WFP	600,000	600,000	-	
Honduras total: 3 programs		1,230,000	1,110,000	120,000	
Nicaragua	ADRA	59,000	59,000	-	-
	PCI	29,076	29,076 (actual: 35,634)	-	-
	SCF	50,000	50,000	-	-
	WFP	400,000	400,000***	-	-
Nicaragua total: 3 programs		538,076	538,076	-	-
<b>LAC total</b>		2,537,076	2,394,760 (94.39%)	142,316 (5.61%)	
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>		17,075,370	<b>14,052,166</b> <b>(82.29%)</b>	1,671,204 (9.79%)	1,352,000 (7.92%)

List of programs are from FY 1999 P.L. 480 Approved Budget Summary Report, BHR/FFP/POD, December 28, 1999. It also includes programs approved in FY 1998 but implemented late in the fiscal year, and not reported last year. FY 1999 approved programs implemented late in the fiscal year will be reported in FY 2000. Programs included are those requiring Transfer Authorizations and results reporting.

In addition to the above:

(a) The SO1 team provided bilateral assistance to Ethiopia and Rwanda. It provided Ethiopia 32,400 metric tons of food commodities, at a total value of over \$8 million, and provided Rwanda 1,650 metric tons valued at \$2 million. Information on beneficiaries is not available.

(b) The SO1 team supported WFP's emergency operations/EMOPs (reflected in above table). In addition, SO1 contributed to the World Food Programme's Protracted Relief Operations (PROs) and Protracted Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (PRROs) that are not reflected in above table. Funding for these are earmarked as pledges. In FY 1999, SO1 contributed 157,277 metric tons of food aid, valued at more than

US \$95 million for these operations. An estimated 10,345,900 beneficiaries were planned for in the 19 countries assisted by Title II emergency food aid. The Office of Food for Peace funded PROs implemented in Africa (Angola, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan). It also funded PRROs implemented in Africa (Guinea, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Uganda), Europe and Eurasia (Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan), and Latin America and the Caribbean (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua).

*Note: Unless indicated, source of data on beneficiary number is from completed SOI reporting questionnaires submitted by implementing partners as part of regular reporting or for R4 process. Where possible, monitoring of programs verify numbers reported.*

*\*Based on last available WFP Standardized Project Report, April – December 1998, actual beneficiaries versus planned averaged 65% for various activities.*

*\*\*Based on monitoring site visits by SOI team during implementation period. Observed distribution coverage ranged from 90 – 100% depending on countries; 90% distribution coverage is used, representing a conservative estimate for overall Balkans region.*

*\*\*\*WFP special report: Emergency Food Operation for the Hurricane Mitch Affected Population, WFP Regional Headquarters, Nicaragua, Central America, April 1999.*

## **ANNEX II - FY 1999 RESULTS AND CASE STUDIES FROM TITLE II EMERGENCY FOOD AID PROGRAMS**

**AUDIENCE: SO1 TEAM, IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS, USAID MISSIONS, CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATIONS, AND AGENCY ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT**

*Note: Information for case studies is drawn from reports submitted by implementing partners. The case studies illustrate results achieved in key areas and lessons learned. Lessons learned (and recommendations) are compiled from submitted reports, and may not necessarily represent the consensus views of implementing partners or that of the Office of Food for Peace. They are helpful to gain a better understanding of implementing partners' perspectives and the key issues that need follow-up dialogue. This is SO1 team's continued effort to engage implementing partners in managing for results.*

### **CASE STUDY 1: RESULTS ON NUTRITIONAL STATUS**

#### **AFRICA**

In *Uganda*, the World Food Programme reported on the nutritional status of children under five years of age. Results are based on findings from Action Contre La Faim (ACF) and Medecins Sans Frontieres/France (MSF-France) nutrition surveys, and are location or settlement specific. Comparison is made between the findings of April/June 1999 and October/December 1999.

Among the Sudanese refugees (Emergency Operation Plan 5623), although there were positive trends in Adjumani and Acholpui settlements, and stabilization of status in Polorinya, there was deterioration of nutritional status in Mvepi, Rhino Camp and Kiryandongo. The assumed causes for this negative trend are seasonality, drought periods that affected agricultural production, and ration cuts. In addition, the timing of the survey and the sample group might have influenced the outcome. The population of Mvepi and Rhino Camp are mobile between the camps and the northern Uganda/southern Sudan region. Some registered in the settlement are present mainly during the food distribution period to collect their food ration. The inclusion of these mobile refugees, who have lower access and utilization of health services, could have negatively influenced the findings since their health and nutritional status is expected to be worse than the resident refugees. Although the negative trend calls for close monitoring of the situation and balanced implementation of ration cuts, UNHCR, WFP and implementing partners agreed to close supplementary feeding programs in the refugee settlements by April 1, 2000. Severely malnourished cases will be referred to nearby hospitals or existing health units, and community health workers will undertake nutritional surveillance.

WFP reported on the nutritional status among the *Great Lakes* refugees (Emergency Operation Plan 5624), with status observed to be very good with malnutrition rates below 5%. No supplementary feeding programs are to be implemented in these settlements, but those severely malnourished will be supported through local health units.

Among internally displaced persons (IDPs) in *northern Uganda* (Emergency Operation Plan 5816), nutritional status of populations in Gulu and Kitgum settlements shows a positive trend over 1999 and remains at acceptable levels. The supplementary feeding program is being phased down with centralization of feeding centers in the most needy areas.

The nutritional status of IDPs in Bundibugyo in November 1999 showed very low malnutrition rates. Per WFP, this indicates energetic sufficiency of the diet, including the WFP food ration. (*Nutrition situation in WFP supported programmes in Uganda in 1999, submitted as attachment to R4 report/questionnaire*)

In *Sudan*, UNICEF undertook nutrition surveys in *Wau town*, the capital of Western Bahr El Ghazal, and four displaced camps (Eastern Bank, Marial Ajith, Baryar, Momoi). This is an area where great humanitarian efforts are being exerted to improve the health and nutritional status of populations affected by conflict. The main objective of the surveys was to determine the change in the nutritional situation between surveys (August 1998, November 1998, and October 1999), and evaluate the impact of program interventions on nutritional status. UNICEF undertook the survey in collaboration with the State Ministry of Health, national and international PVOs/NGOs such as CARE, ACF, and MSF-Holland who contributed personnel, transport and equipment.

There was improvement in nutritional status of vulnerable groups. The global malnutrition rate for Wau town was 9.4% in October 1999, compared to 9.6% in November 1998 and 43.3% in August 1998. Severe malnutrition rate for Wau town had fallen to 1.1% in October 1999 from 2.4% in November 1998, and 18.6 % in August 1998. The improvement in nutritional status is attributed to the provision of full relief rations by WFP, better access to health facilities, no further influx of population, therapeutic feeding centers for sick children open 24 hours a day, and supplementary feeding centers for regular follow up. (*Result of Nutrition Survey, Wau town/Displaced camps, Bahr El Ghazal, Sudan, UNICEF – OLS, 23 – 27 October 1999*)

*Kassala, Sudan*: As part of the 1999 Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) Annual Needs Assessment, WFP, UNICEF and the Sudanese Red Crescent conducted a nutrition survey in the IDP camps around Kassala. The purpose of the survey was to determine the nutritional status of children less than five years of age in the seven IDP camps around Kassala, and to recommend interventions to improve or prevent deterioration of nutritional status. The overall global malnutrition rate was 8.8% with moderate malnutrition of 7.6%, and a severe malnutrition rate of 1.2%. The main food source for the IDPs was food aid provided by WFP (90.5%). The IDPs contributed to this ration with their own production (5%) and market sources (4.5%). Many households owned livestock and thus had ready access to milk. (*Summary Report, Nutrition Survey in Kassala IDP Camps, 28-31 December 1999*)

*Nimule and Labone Corridors, Sudan*: Catholic Relief Services conducted a nutrition survey in Nimule and Labone Corridors in November 1999. The survey was undertaken

in conjunction with Norwegian People's Aid, Dioceses of Torit, Jesuit Relief Services and Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA). The results of the survey was compared with the previous ones conducted in February/March and November 1997, and May 1999, in Labone and Mugale. The survey used weight for height measurements, with children who are moderately malnourished as below weight for height  $-2$  z scores or below 80% of median, and those severely malnourished as children below weight for height  $-3$  z scores or below 70% of median. Using weight for height z-scores, the results showed a global acute malnutrition rate of 15.7% in the Nimule Corridor and 21.5% in the Lobone Corridor. A lower prevalence of 9.9% and 12.4% was found in Nimule and Labone respectively using weight for height percent of median measurement.

When compared with the May 1999 result, there was a significant increase in the levels of global malnutrition (z-scores). The rate of increase was by 2.5% points in Nimule and by 3.5% points in Lobone (May 1999 prevalence rates of 13.2% and 18% respectively). The apparent increase in levels of malnutrition could be due to the timing of the survey that was conducted during the malaria peak season (November – January), with the May 1999 survey conducted when malaria infection was low. If compared with the malaria season of November 1997, the results showed that the new levels were 3.5% lower but not significant in Nimule while those in Lobone were significantly lower at 6.1%. The rates in November 1997 were 19.2% in Nimule and 27.6% in Lobone. This showed the current nutrition status was better than in November 1997. The study concluded that the reason for the lower levels could be a result of intervention as there was no intervention in November 1997. (*Nutrition Survey Conducted in the Nimule and Lobone Corridors by Catholic Relief Services in collaboration with Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), Diocese of Torit (DOT) and Jesuit Relief Services (JRS), November 1999.*)

*Bahr el Ghazal region, Tonj and Gogrial counties:* World Vision monitors the nutritional status of beneficiaries and conducts nutrition surveys every six months in project sites. A nutrition survey carried out at the height of the 1998 emergency (April and May 1998) revealed that 33.4 % (Tong country) and 40.8% (Gogrial country) of children under five years of age were suffering from global malnutrition (below 80% weight for height). World Vision responded immediately by opening therapeutic feeding centers where the severely malnourished children were admitted, and distributed dry rations to cater for children under five years of age, lactating and pregnant women. A follow-up survey in November 1998 revealed that malnutrition levels had reduced from 33.4% to 18.3% in Tong county, and from 40.8% to 11.9% in Gogrial county.

Since the SO1 team reported this status in its R4 report, World Vision conducted a survey in May 1999. The results showed that malnutrition levels were further reduced to 13.2% in Tong county, and 9.7% in Gogrial county. This is the first time in twelve months that malnutrition levels fell below the 10%, the cut off for critical levels of malnutrition in Sudan established by Operation Lifeline Sudan guidelines. The May 1999 survey was followed by a survey in November 1999. Results were recently released, indicating malnutrition rates of 8% in Tong county, and 5.9% in Gogrial county.

Overall, there has been a significant improvement in nutritional status since April 1998, the beginning of the famine. In Tonj country, the program reduced malnutrition rates from 33.4% to 8%. In Gogrial country, malnutrition rates decreased from 40.8% to 5.9%.

World Vision attributes the marked nutrition improvement to a number of factors. There were nutrition monitoring activities and supplementary feeding for malnourished children. There was constant availability of adequate relief food. Between January and November 1999, World Vision and WFP distributed cereals and pulses. One lesson learned is that any nutrition intervention, be it therapeutic or supplementary feeding program, will only be effective if an adequate general ration is distributed. However, relief food alone cannot be a major factor in achieving sustainable food security. It should be accompanied with other non-food inputs such as agricultural inputs in order to create long-term food security. Due to the relative security, the communities were able to grow and harvest some food, supplementing the relief food. Most of the community members had also returned with the cattle and goats, and therefore had access to milk and some meat.

*(Nutritional Survey, Gogrial and Tonj County, Bahr el Ghazal, South Sudan, November 1999, World Vision Sudan)*

#### **ASIA & NEAR EAST**

In *Indonesia*, World Vision undertook a baseline nutrition and health survey in East Jakarta district in June 1999. The results determined that malnutrition is prevalent in under-five children. The prevalence levels were stunting at 31.7%, underweight at 44.5%, and wasting at 21.9%. These prevalence rates are higher than results of an earlier March 1998 survey undertaken by the University of Indonesia. Results of a follow-up survey conducted October 26-29, 1999, are being analyzed. *(World Vision, Mid Term Report, April – September 1999)*

In *Afghanistan*, Focus Humanitarian Assistance (USA), in collaboration with the Aga Khan Foundation (USA), conducted a survey in Badakshan, January/February 2000. Included in the survey were eight districts, six of which had Title II emergency food distribution. Results are being analyzed. Preliminary results indicate that the main problems are underweight and stunting, and that wasting prevalence was higher in young age groups, 6-23 months. *(AKF-USA R4 report/nutrition template)*

#### **LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARRIBBEAN**

In the *Dominican Republic*, American Red Cross conducted a survey in the provinces of San Juan de la Maguana, Azua, Barahona, and Bahoruco to establish a baseline for follow-up food and nutrition programs, and to identify areas for possible health and nutrition education programs. The survey was undertaken during September 20-25, 1998 in collaboration with the Dominican Red Cross. The survey showed that approximately 15% of children are stunted. Of these children, 3.5% are severely stunted and 11.5% are moderately stunted. Although only 3% are wasted, some 18% are mildly wasted. This reflects a greater percentage of children who are at risk in terms of developing severe

wasting. While 10% of children are underweight, 29% are mildly underweight indicating a total of 39% suffering from some degree of underweight. On the other hand, nearly 10% were overweight and 2% were obese. The prevalence of wasting and underweight is lower in children six months and younger, particularly among females, than in older children. (*Nutritional Status, Breastfeeding, Weaning and Prenatal Care of Children and their Mothers, in the Provinces of San Juan de la Maguana, Azua, Barhona, and Bahoruco in the Dominican Republic: Results of a Cross-Sectional Survey. Final Report, December 1999, Irma Silva-Barbeau, for the American Red Cross, Washington DC, and the Dominican Republic Red Cross, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.*)

In Honduras, the CRS/CARE emergency program was designed principally as a support to the national rehabilitation and reconstruction effort. Although there was no baseline study of nutritional status undertaken, there was agreement on the need to have some measure of the program's impact on the nutrition situation. Did the distribution of food in response to Hurricane Mitch contribute to stabilizing and/or improving the nutritional status in the municipalities served by the Title II program implemented by CRS and CARE? To answer this question, CRS and CARE conducted a study during November/December 1999. The study was designed to determine the nutritional changes in the reference population of children under five in municipalities served by the emergency program. Data for June 1998 through July 1999 was reviewed.

It was determined that the Ministry of Health's pre- and post-Mitch nutrition surveillance data for children under five would be used to evaluate program impact. Although this would not permit direct attribution of benefits to the program, the data was considered appropriate as an indication of the nutritional impact of the program. The results showed the reduction in the incidence of malnutrition in the under five population with an overall decline of prevalence by 3.9 percentage points. The data also showed a decline in the incidence of diarrhea. However, there was an increase in the incidence of acute respiratory infections. It was noted that the malnutrition situation of municipalities with high incidence of diarrhea did not improve, demonstrating the clear linkage of diarrheal disease with nutritional status. The data also presents a positive relationship between acute respiratory infections and malnutrition. The study concluded that the distribution of food commodities was timely and appropriate; but it also raised the concern that the program had created a level of dependency in targeted communities. The dependency would manifest itself in a rise in malnutrition once food distribution was halted.

Based on this study, the recommendations were that (a) food distribution should be done in coordination with the Ministry of Health and with NGO health service providers to ensure greater coverage in times of crisis, (b) major efforts in the area of health education are necessary to orient populations to the risks of malnutrition, diarrhea and acute respiratory infections, and these initiatives should be complemented by programs to improve sanitation infrastructure, (c) it is essential to incorporate food security considerations in national relief and rehabilitation plans, to ensure that decisions taken prevent decline in nutritional status not only among displaced persons, but in the population at large, and, (d) in order to avoid dependency, rehabilitation programming should focus on assisting affected populations to resume their productive activities as

quickly as possible following a disaster. (*CRS Honduras, Reaching Out to the Needy: Final Report of the Hurricane Mitch Emergency Response Program*)

In *Nicaragua*, ADRA is monitoring the nutritional status of children aged 6-59 months in project areas in Nueva Segovia and Esteli. In September 1998, of 7,158 children monitored, 18.9% were severely malnourished. 43% were considered at risk, and 35.7% considered normal. This is compared with results in March 1999. Of 8,251 children monitored, 17.9% were malnourished. 37% were considered at risk of malnutrition, and 42.7% were in the normal range. These results indicate that children's nutritional status was better in March 1999 than in September 1998. (*ADRA Nicaragua, R4 report/nutrition template*)



## CASE STUDY 2: NEEDS ASSESSMENT AND TARGETING OF VULNERABLE GROUPS

In *Tanzania*, WFP reported on a system of “community managed targeting and distribution” which placed the onus of allocating food to individuals on the villagers themselves. Community managed targeting is a novel form of program design for Tanzania. The approach and framework for this type of intervention was provided by SCF Tanzania program. After a process of sensitization, the system essentially hands over responsibility for intra-village targeting and distribution to the community. The key features of the system are democratic elections of relief or distribution committees, public discussions regarding eligibility criteria, registration and verification, transparency and accountability. In general, all stakeholders were extremely positive about the community targeting process at village level. This included government staff from central government down to village executive officer level, and beneficiaries.

An evaluation report commissioned by DFID in June 1999 concluded “the system is democratic, transparent and ensures accountability.” The system reduced the involvement/cost of implementing agency staff once the sensitization process has been completed. The system puts in place a new committee structure at village level that can be retained in non-emergency periods for food security monitoring and planning activities.

The involvement of women in the relief or distribution committees has had a considerable empowering effect on women at village level. The female committee members became adept at public speaking, debate and problem solving. 50 percent of the committees are women selected from each sub-village. This is in marked contrast to the previous system used where village government committees (comprised of at least 75 percent males) were responsible for selecting households. (*WFP Tanzania, R4 questionnaire and attached report “A Review of the 1998/1999 Community Managed Targeted Emergency Feeding Programmes in Singida and Dodoma Regions of Central Tanzania”, J. Shoham. Report Commissioned by DFID East Africa, July 1999*)

In the *Balkans*, in July 1999, WFP and FAO conducted a rapid Food Economy Assessment in order to understand how a coherent food aid program could be established in Kosovo. By the end of July, over 740,000 refugees had returned to Kosovo. More than 500,000 people had their homes destroyed or severely damaged during the conflict, resulting in large numbers of IDPs who either sought shelter with host families, or who moved their families to urban centers in search of housing and/or employment. Others lived in tents in the hope that repairs could be made before winter. Beneficiaries included families without shelter, IDPs and host families, persons permanently unable to generate an income, social cases. By July 1999, operations in Kosovo were full scale, with general distributions by WFP, CRS and MCI designed to reach 80 percent of the population.

In order to move from general distribution to targeted distribution, beneficiary selection criteria committees in each of the Areas of Responsibility (AORs) were set up through collaboration between WFP, UNHCR, implementing partners and local distribution partners at the grassroots level. The recommendations that came out of this highly

participatory process were then refined at the province level, where a set of criteria was established for the next six months, commencing in September 1999. This resulted in a 30 percent decrease of the total caseload between July and December 1999. The caseload remained constant through the winter, after which another targeting cycle started, based on new assessments. (*The WFP's Balkan Operations, Progress Report No. 1, July – September 1999*)

### **CASE STUDY 3: RELIEF TO DEVELOPMENT – SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION OF LIBERIA**

As of FY 2000, the Liberia emergency program was transitioned over to development food aid with provision made to ensure that malnourished children under five years of age and accompanying adults continue to receive therapeutic feeding through the World Food Programme's Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) for West Africa Coastal.

The successful hand-over to development food aid has taken several years. From 1990 to 1996, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and the World Food Programme (WFP) implemented a joint program that focused on meeting the immediate food needs of people during the civil war. During this period, the program provided food to over one million Liberians residing either as internally displaced persons (IDPs) in camps in Liberia, or as refugees outside the country. There was much resistance to change.

After peace was finally established and elections held in 1997, the Title II food program, supplying about 85 percent of all food aid in Liberia, shifted its emphasis from emergency feeding to post-war transition activities and the rebuilding of the country. All cooperating sponsors were asked to re-vamp their programs. For example, at the start of 1997, 350,000 beneficiaries received emergency food aid in IDP camps. By end 1997, approximately 150,000 IDPs were permanently resettled in rural areas. General food distributions in IDP camps were discontinued in favor of targeted activities in rural areas. The post-war transition activities included rural resettlement of IDPs and refugees, agricultural recovery such as seed protection rations, rural school feeding, food-for-work for teachers and health workers, and food-for-work for rehabilitation of institutions and infrastructure.

Emergency Title II food aid, in combination with other donor activities, played a significant role in increasing food production in 1997. 118,000 farm families received food rations as part of the seeds and tools program funded by OFDA, the European Union (ECHO) and the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Food aid encouraged agricultural production activities for recently returned IDPs and refugees by ensuring seed rice was planted and not consumed, and by increasing farmers' energy available for doing work. In addition, food aid contributed to agricultural rehabilitation through food-for-work activities. The FAO estimated that rice production, which was approximately only 30 percent of pre-war levels in 1996, increased to 60 percent of pre-war levels in 1997. As a consequence, estimated food aid requirements for 1998 reduced considerably, and scarce foreign exchange was saved through greater food production and reduced need for commercial imports.

Title II emergency food aid had played a major role in rehabilitating institutions that provided critical social services. This included food-for-work for reconstructing health care institutions and hospitals. Food was also provided to schools and vocational training institutes. This enabled over 1,200 war-affected youths to receive skills training from vocational training institutions. The emergency school feeding program implemented by WFP resulted in the re-opening of 1,250 schools by the end of 1997. The program

assisted an estimated 320,000 primary school children and 20,616 schoolteachers throughout Liberia.

In 1998, the security situation remained relatively stable allowing large numbers of IDPs and refugees to resettle in their original towns and villages. The impact of the food distribution was twofold. Given that most residents were returnees, the availability of the commodities succeeded in bridging the food security gap in the targeted communities. The commodities also served as an inducement for voluntary return of the displaced population to their home communities. This was verified by the termination of food assistance to Kakata and Buchanan shelters in early 1998. These shelters were physically emptied, with continued closure of the camps after March 1998, and the registration of IDP cardholders at the resettlement food distribution sites. 9,000 IDPs in Kakata and Buchanan successfully resettled in their areas by end February 1998.

In 1999, the transition program supported self-sufficiently and food security through the development of community rice swamps and rehabilitation of rural infrastructure to increase access to markets and improve public health. The impact evaluation of the CRS program undertaken in 1999 showed a number of positive changes. The percentage of program institutions achieving at least 70 percent of pre-war staffing levels rose from 60 percent to 75 percent within a year. There was eight percent increase in staff attendance levels. Qualitative findings from the evaluation indicated that the program helped reduce individual family food expenditures and reduced malnutrition in pregnant and lactating mothers and children under five in many communities.

*References: SOI R4s - April 1998 and June 1999, CRS/Liberia – CY1999 TAP Final Performance and Situation Reports.*

#### **CASE STUDY 4: RESPONSE TO HURRICANES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARRIBBEAN**

During the first week of November 1998, Hurricane Mitch struck Central America affecting thousands of families, in *Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador*. Hurricane George struck *Dominican Republic* affecting thousands more. The massive destruction caused by the storm pushed countries into a state of emergency. The Office of Food for Peace responded with the provision of 132,700 metric tons of Title II emergency food aid, valued at \$81,171,000. Implementing partners were Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), American Red Cross (ARC), Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Project Concern International (PCI), Save the Children (SCF), and the World Food Programme (WFP).

Food distribution programs met with remarkable success. Food aid reduced the risk of malnutrition and death due to food scarcity. In Guatemala, for example, no deaths were reported due to lack of food in CARE project areas. The majority of programs (8 of the 13 programs) reported maintaining or improving nutritional status of beneficiaries. In Honduras (CARE, WFP), Nicaragua (ADRA, SCF), available data can substantiate this report. From interviews with beneficiaries in Guatemala, it was clear that food distribution improved the household food situation and met critical needs (CRS). Families had access to food in a timely and continuous manner for the initial critical few months that guaranteed their resumption of normal life. In the Dominican Republic, the need for food decreased from the most urgent need to the third within a few months (ARC). However, as food need was met, new needs surfaced, such as housing and health care needs.

The rapid response in providing food assistance during the first days and weeks of the disaster was due, in part, to the food inventories maintained in these countries for the development projects under implementation. In addition, the Office of Food for Peace airlifted more than 2,600 metric tons of food commodities to Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.

Food distribution was just one aspect of emergency response. Besides providing for nutritional needs of families, food aid created job opportunities in the reconstruction of communities with emphasis on restoring the capacity of communities. Programs rehabilitated over 13,108 kilometers of road, and repaired or reconstructed more than 26,608 houses. At minimum, 20,825 latrines and 1,708 water systems were rehabilitated.

The food-for-work programs helped in integrating members of communities in activities to improve their own lives. In Guatemala, for example, comments from local counterpart institutions reported that food aid led to the unexpected result of people realizing the importance of organizing as a community in order to respond to disasters (CRS). In Nicaragua (PCI), the program has contributed to a greater unity between community members with each community organization able to carry out food-for-work program within their own communities. Communities gained skills in planning, implementing and monitoring their activities. In Guatemala (CARE), the relationship between

municipalities and communities was strengthened, channeling support and organization of the disaster response through the municipal committees. Social conflicts such as looting of stores for food were avoided due to the availability of food aid.

Through food-for-work, PVOs and WFP, in coordination with local governments, local NGOs, and other donors, helped to reconstruct communities. Food-for-work supported the rehabilitation of homes, roads, bridges, water systems, latrines, schools, and supported efforts to rebuild local agricultural production. To prevent and mitigate disasters, programs constructed small preventive dams, reforested areas with trees from local nurseries and barriers. In El Salvador, WFP organized workshops with local NGOs and trained over 6,000 people on soil conservation, water management, the environment, use of organic fertilizers, and other agricultural techniques.

Programs were coordinated with local government and other donors. In Guatemala, WFP reported that government involvement and donor contribution strengthened the project, making possible the achievement of objectives. The participation of NGOs and municipalities resulted in expanded project coverage. The participation of the Social Investment Fund (FIS) was a key success factor for the rapid reconstruction of infrastructure. In Honduras, government officials played a key role in coordinating food-for-work activities with the various cooperating sponsors trying to provide damage assessments to facilitate targeting. Because of this coordination, CARE was able to secure financing for a latrine project with the Ministry of External Cooperation targeted to areas affected by Mitch.

In El Salvador, without the administrative and logistical support of the Salvadorian government, the program could not have been carried out. The complete involvement of the GOES allowed for the rapid assistance (within hours) given to Hurricane Mitch victims. Once NGOs were given the responsibility of distributing food and executing food for work activities, the GOES demonstrated efficiency in its handling of the tasks: reception of the food items at the port, transport to GOES warehouses, the warehousing itself, and the preparation of the monthly food quotas and its packaging, before its transfer to NGOs. The efficient use of complementary resources provided by NGOs, donors (EU, GTZ, USAID), US military (for bridges, roads) and WFP itself allowed for a focusing of efforts in favor of the beneficiaries and increased the impact of the activities (WFP El Salvador).

The Crisis Corps/Peace Corps provided volunteers to monitor activities and this support facilitated to reach the planned targets and food distribution (WFP Dominican Republic)

***Lessons learned*** (and recommendations) are drawn from reports submitted by implementing partners:

1. Emergency food programs should be supported by interventions to improve water and sanitation conditions in affected areas. In the Dominican Republic, insufficient food was associated with more reported illness and a greater need for medical attention. In response, ARC is initiating a community health education

project to focus on disease prevention, promotion of breastfeeding and sound weaning practices (ARC). In Honduras, there was correlation of malnutrition with significant increase in the incidence of intestinal infections and diarrhea. Some correlation was also detected between increased malnutrition and incidence of respiratory illnesses (CARE). Food programs should be better coordinated with existing health or medical support groups to influence sanitary conditions and nutritional practices. For this, training and infrastructure support is needed. FFP emergency guidelines should be broadened to enable training both for staff and project participants to enable greater institutionalization of processes and contribute to sustainability.

2. Success of the Hurricane Mitch response program was due to the full, organized participation of the victims of this tragedy in resolving their own problem. Reinforcing municipal governments was essential for facilitating longer-term rehabilitation activities. Daily involvement in determining their destiny helped break the feeling of powerlessness felt by many of the displaced. Reinforcing municipal governments was essential for facilitating longer term rehabilitation activities. This contributed to maintaining social order in the country (CARE Honduras). The strengthening of grassroots organizations in crisis situation raised the self-esteem of beneficiaries. (WFP, Guatemala). Communities went beyond simply completing community activities and the required number of service hours; they also contributed with their own tools, transportation and in many case, with their own money for the purchase of gas, barbed wires and other items (PCI Nicaragua).
3. Populations in affected areas were not adequately prepared to respond to disasters of this magnitude (CARE Guatemala). In many communities, there was a lack of community organization to handle food distributions efficiently (CRS Guatemala). Temporary shelters in high-risk zones were insufficient and deficient. Programs should be supported to work directly with local disaster communities to improve capacities to plan for and respond to future disasters. The local voluntary emergency committees formed in response to Mitch need to be better linked to both the national and departmental disaster coordination network.
4. The existence of Title II food commodities, for development programs, allowed for rapid response. The existence of readily available food stocks to provide in emergency situation is of utmost importance. The planning for contingencies would provide a cushion to the country offices in countries prone to periodic natural disasters.
5. The existence of previously validated monitoring, reporting and evaluation instruments facilitated the work. A preliminary field assessment during crisis situation facilitates the analysis of the magnitude of the disaster and required responses. (WFP El Salvador).

6. Government involvement and participation of municipalities was crucial (CARE, Honduras). In El Salvador, without the administration and logistical support of the Salvadorian government, the program could not have been carried out. The complete involvement of the government allowed for the rapid assistance (within hours) given to Hurricane Mitch victims. Once NGOs were given the responsibility of distributing food and executing food-for-work activities, the El Salvadorian government demonstrated efficiency in its handling of the myriad tasks involved: reception of food items at the port, transport to government warehouses, warehousing of commodities, and preparation of monthly food quotas and its packaging before transfer to NGOs. (WFP El Salvador)
7. The efficient use of complementary resources provided by PVOs and WFP, local NGOs, donors, U.S. and local military, allowed for focusing of efforts in favor of beneficiaries and increased the impact of activities. (WFP, El Salvador). The Crisis Corps/Peace Corps provided volunteers to monitor activities and this support facilitated to reach the planned targets in food distribution. (WFP Dominican Republic).
8. It is important to have pre-established disaster vulnerability and socioeconomic indicators by gender. This improved the quality of the decisions made in order to target with more precision (WFP El Salvador).

*References: ADRA, ARC, CARE, CRS, PCI, SCF, WFP - R4 questionnaires and supplementary reports.*



## CASE STUDY 5: RESPONSE TO THE KOSOVO CRISIS

At the end of February and beginning of March 1998, the first clashes between the Serbian Government forces and armed Kosovo Albanians occurred in central Kosovo. This led to the initial displacement of some 20,000 people in affected villages. The violence increased incrementally, and escalated during the winter and early spring of 1999. During this period, Title II assistance programs implemented by the World Food Programme (WFP), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Mercy Corps International (MCI), and the American Red Cross (ARC), were targeted towards internally displaced people, host families, and war-affected people in *Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia*.

In late March, with the failure of peace talks, NATO launched a bombing campaign which, combined with a surge of military and paramilitary activity in Kosovo, resulted in massive population movements within the province and across its borders into neighboring Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro. By May 1999, at the height of the refugee crisis, over 700,000 men, women and children had been forced from their homes and across borders. Another 600,000 were thought to be displaced within Kosovo.

In April, the Office of Food for Peace and its implementing partners were able to shift Title II stocks available in the region to help meet the initial needs of refugees pouring into *Albania* and *Macedonia*. In May 1999, UNHCR estimated 439,600 refugees in Albania, 252,600 refugees in Macedonia, and 64,700 refugees in Montenegro. Concerned that food needs of refugees would soon outstrip the abilities of its implementing partners to program for them, the Office of Food for Peace and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) decided to "pre-position" 15,000 MT of Title II and 416(b) commodities in the region. The arrival of USG commodities in June coincided with the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops from Kosovo and the cessation of NATO bombing. In July and August, these pre-positioned commodities provided WFP, CRS and MCI the means to re-establish distribution networks throughout Kosovo, meeting the emergency food needs of Kosovars who had remained in the province as well as those returning from refugee camps in Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro.

The return of refugees to Kosovo after the entry of KFOR on June 12, 1999, was immediate and immense. By the end of July, over 740,000 refugees had returned to Kosovo. More than 500,000 people had their homes destroyed or severely damaged during the conflict, resulting in large numbers of IDPs who either sought shelter with host families, or who moved their families to urban centers in search of housing and/or employment. Others lived in tents in the hope that repairs could be made before winter. Beneficiaries included families without shelter, IDPs and host families, persons permanently unable to generate an income, social cases. By July 1999, operations in Kosovo were full scale, with general distributions by WFP, CRS and MCI designed to reach 80 percent of the population. A total of 1.48 million people in Kosovo received the 17,000 metric tons of food that WFP, CRS and MCI distributed. By the end of August, the logistics and pipeline situations had stabilized.

In total, the Office of Food for Peace provided 80,090 metric tons of FY 1999 Title II emergency food aid, valued at over \$57 million dollars to emergency programs implemented by CRS, MCI, ARC, and WFP in the Balkans. The majority of this assistance went to Kosovo, and more than half of the total was distributed by WFP.

Throughout the crisis, WFP made use of virtually every type of transport available to ensure that food aid reached refugees and IDPs. While the pre-positioning of food in the region helped to ensure that sufficient stocks were available, logistic constraints -- specifically inadequate port, road and border infrastructures -- proved to be the greatest constraint to a consistent pipeline. Close coordination and intra-agency loans between WFP, CRS, and MCI helped to prevent serious distribution delays.

There were many other examples of successful coordination during the Kosovo crisis. Joint contingency planning and preparation helped to ensure rapid movement of NGOs and international organizations back into Kosovo after the NATO air strikes. To facilitate the humanitarian intervention, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and WFP had divided Kosovo into seven areas of responsibility (AORs) and assigned international NGOs to each of them to operate as implementing partners for UNHCR and WFP. WFP assumed responsibility for five AORs. CRS and MCI assumed responsibility for other two.

UNHCR supplied non-food commodities such as stoves, kitchen sets, blankets, sleeping pads and other critical items. These non-food commodities were distributed by the agencies responsible for food distribution in each AOR. The integration of food and non-food distributions enhanced the Title II emergency food aid program by providing to beneficiaries those items needed for preparation of food and basic living supplies. These items allowed beneficiaries to remain or return to their homes instead of internally migrating. Other donors also financed capital goods such as vehicles and office equipment critical to the success of the overall program. OFDA and private donors supplemented the standard Food for Peace ration with items such as salt, sugar, fresh food and dairy products further enhancing the beneficiaries' nutritional status. MCI implemented wide-ranging programs in the agricultural (supported by OFDA, ECHO) and health sector (supported by UNHCR) aimed at enhancing the quality of life and reducing the number of beneficiaries receiving free food. Provision of several types seed, tractors and tractor parts was part of a long-term strategy to reduce beneficiary dependence on humanitarian food supplies.

Against the backdrop of one of the largest and most visible humanitarian disasters in the past 30 years, overall performance was outstanding (MCI). The goal to avoid starvation and maintain nutritional status of affected populations was successful. In its report on the Kosovo crisis, the Refugee Nutrition Information System (RNIS) of the U.N. Subcommittee on Nutrition indicated that "overall, the international community was successful in preventing acute malnutrition, among the Kosovan refugees", and, "the international community has been successful in preventing wasting and associated humanitarian crisis." (*RNIS 27, July 7, 1999*)

In addition, from program start-up during the tense months preceding NATO air strikes, to the region-wide response during the refugee crisis, and rapid start-up upon return to Kosovo, the Office of Food Peace's implementing partners provided many extraordinary examples of coordination, flexibility, and perseverance.

Lessons learned in the Kosovo crisis are drawn from reports submitted by implementing partners:

1. *Contingency planning* should be based on worst-case scenario, with provisions for a rapid and large-scale response. The suddenness of the exodus of ethnic Albanian Kosovars in March 1999 took UN agencies by surprise. The quantity of food stocks and equipment fell short of the requirement, and their positioning did not sufficiently take into account the rupture of transport routes caused by the war.
2. *The rapid deployment of experienced staff* ensures a quick and effective response. However, it involves a high financial cost and imposes a sacrifice on lower-priority operations. The Balkan operation experience highlights the need for mechanisms to move staff even more quickly to assist in the start-up of an emergency operation.
3. *Close coordination with the military*, when it is a key player, needs to be organized early in the operation. Insufficient cooperation, noticed at the time of the exodus of Kosovars in March, was largely corrected by the time of their return. WFP's collaboration with NATO and other military forces greatly enhanced the quality of WFP's support to Kosovars and reduced the disruptions to local communities.
4. *Early high-level political contacts*, such as were established through the Emergency Management Group in Albania, expedite critical decision-making processes.
5. *Field communications* are key to effective programming and staff security. For example, WFP invested early on in the Balkans to develop comprehensive radio and e-mail links, which have proven useful for other agencies as well.
6. *Strong partnerships* between individuals and organizations help to accomplish a common task. MCI reported that its performance was enhanced by a strong partnership with CRS in Kosovo. Through close coordination at all levels, MCI and CRS established a program widely recognized as effective, organized and fully operational under extreme circumstances. Cooperation with local partners, such as The Mother Teresa Society, the Macedonian Government and Red Cross and the Montenegrin Government and Red Cross has brought to the forefront the importance of coordination between international NGOs and their national counterparts. ARC reported that there was close collaboration with the Yugoslav Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (Federation).

*References: The WFP's Balkan Operations, Progress Report No. 1, July – September 1999, Progress Report No. 2, October – December 1999; MCI (Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia), ARC (Serbia, Montenegro)*

### **ANNEX III: GREATER HORN OF AFRICA INITIATIVE**

The Office of Food for Peace (Emergency Response Division) contributed to the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) with its own resources. In FY 1999, it provided a total of 180,514 metric tons of food aid valued at \$130,528,900 to nine of the ten countries included in GHAI (see breakdown below). The majority of activities support GHAI Strategic Objective 2: Implement strategies and procedures to ensure the transition from crisis to broad-based sustainable growth.

Food aid is used to assist the region to move from dependency to sustainable development by ensuring that Title II emergency food aid programs incorporate approaches that link relief to development. Relief resources are used to address both immediate needed and longer-term objectives. SO1 Team's Intermediate Result 3 is "Improved Planning to Transition Relief Activities to Development". In FY 1999, 77.36 percent of programs developed resettlement or rehabilitation plans to link relief to development (IR3, indicator 1). 88.68 percent of programs paid specific attention to avoiding the negative impacts of food aid in program design and implementation by incorporating six core values or criteria established by SO1 Team and implementing partners (IR3, indicator 2). These values are that Title II emergency food aid programs:

- (a) Should include an exit strategy that supports community stabilization. Result: implemented by 58.49 percent of programs
- (b) Should encourage local capacity building and beneficiary participation. Result: implemented by 75.47 percent of programs
- (c) Should not undermine local agricultural production or local markets. Result: implemented by 66.04 percent of programs
- (d) Should integrate with development assistance. Result: implemented by 52.83 percent of programs
- (e) Should seek gender and ethnic equity based on need. Result: implemented by 66.04 percent of programs
- (f) Should encourage impartial and neutral [food] distribution network. Result: implemented by 77.36 percent of programs

**TITLE II EMERGENCY FOOD AID PROGRAM CONTRIBUTION TO GHAI – FY 1999**

COUNTRY	PARTNER	METRIC TONS OF FOOD	TOTAL VALUE (Commodity & freight) (\$000)	NUMBER OF BENEFICIARIES TARGETED (PLANNED)	NUMBER OF BENEFICIARIES REACHED (ACTUAL)
<b>Ethiopia</b>	<b>REST</b>	<b>14,690</b>	<b>5,883.6</b>	<b>150,000</b>	<b>150,000</b>
	<b>WFP</b>	<b>19,550</b>	<b>11,630</b>	<b>1,200,000</b>	<b>1,200,000</b>
<b>Great Lakes regional (Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania)</b>	<b>WFP</b>	<b>19,864</b>	<b>10,515.1</b>	<b>1,200,000</b>	<b>1,380,000</b>
<b>Somalia</b>	<b>CARE</b>	<b>16,000</b>	<b>9,939.6</b>	<b>250,000</b>	<b>451,400</b>
<b>Sudan</b>	<b>ADRA</b>	<b>7,780</b>	<b>4,946.2</b>	<b>11,840</b>	<b>18,301</b>
	<b>CRS</b>	<b>17,340</b>	<b>14,910.7</b>	<b>143,700</b>	<b>143,700</b>
	<b>LWR</b>	<b>11,070</b>	<b>13,195.1</b>	<b>115,000</b>	<b>115,000</b>
	<b>NPA</b>	<b>8,570</b>	<b>5,909.1</b>	<b>120,365</b>	<b>124,984</b>
	<b>WFP</b>	<b>7,000</b>	<b>15,225</b>	<b>2,360,000</b>	<b>1,770,000</b>
	<b>WVUS</b>	<b>6,190</b>	<b>9,585.2</b>	<b>127,519</b>	<b>127,519</b>
<b>Tanzania</b>	<b>WFP</b>	<b>13,000</b>	<b>6,361.8</b>	<b>792,000</b>	<b>792,558</b>
<b>Uganda</b>	<b>WFP</b>	<b>15,500</b>	<b>8,472.9</b>	<b>512,000</b>	<b>503,814</b>
<b>Total: 7 countries</b>	<b>12 programs</b>	<b>156,554</b>	<b>116,574.3</b>	<b>6,982,424</b>	<b>6,777,276</b>

In addition to the above, SO1 Team contributed to the World Food Programme's Protracted Relief Operations (PROs) in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan, and Protracted Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (PRROs) in Uganda. This amounted to 23,960 metric tons of food commodities at a total value of \$13,954,600.

## **ANNEX IV: UPDATED RESULTS FRAMEWORK**

### **Strategic Objective 1: Critical Food Needs of Targeted Groups Reached**

#### **Intermediate Result 1: Improved Targeting of Food Aid to the Most Vulnerable Populations**

#### **Intermediate Result 2: Food Aid Delivered to Target Groups on Schedule**

Delete IR2, Indicator 2: Percent of proposals reviewed and cooperating sponsors notified of decisions within 21 business days of receipt.

Explanation: While the indicator may serve a bureaucratic purpose, it does not impact decisions to respond or not to a humanitarian request.

#### **Intermediate Result 3: Improved Planning to Transition Relief Activities to Development**

#### **Intermediate Result 4: Strengthened Capabilities of Cooperating Sponsors and Host Country Entities to Manage Emergency Food Aid Programs**

Delete IR4, Indicator 1: Percent of Institutional Support Grant (ISG) supporting emergency planning/evaluation.

Explanation: This was deleted in FY 1997 as it was not useful for SO1 management